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Water, Economics, and Policy in Developing Countries
Evan Michael Plous
Water is essential for life, and access to sources of safe water and sanitation facilities is
a first-order concern for economic welfare and general well-being. While the majority of
residents in developing countries have access to improved water and sanitation services,
many parts of the developing world lag significantly behind in this vital infrastructure.
This dissertation studies policies aimed at increasing access, quality, and efficiency of im-
proved water and sanitation (WS) services in developing countries. In the following three
chapters, I focus on non-technological methods for improving service by eliminating the
economic, political, and institutional barriers to safe water and sanitation provision.
Chapter 1, “The Buck Stops Where? Federalism and Investment in the Brazilian Water
and Sanitation Sector”, shows how weak institutions can undermine public goods ser-
vice when multiple levels of government share responsibility of provision. In particular,
I study how legal ambiguities regarding degrees of governmental authority can lead to
systematic underinvestment in public utilities. I examine the Brazilian water and sanita-
tion (WS) sector, which presents an natural experiment of shared provision between state
and municipality entities. I look at a legal reform that clarified the relationship between
municipalities and states in a quasi-experimental, difference-in-differences framework,
using an administrative, municipality-level panel dataset from 2001-2012. I find that
when expropriation risk by state companies diminished - self-run municipalities almost
doubled their WS network investment. This increase in investment led to a significant
increase in access to the WS system in these municipalities. The analysis provides strong
evidence that reforms that strengthen residual control rights and eliminate the threat of
intra-governmental expropriation can lead to large increases in public goods investment.
Chapter 2, “The Role of Basic Sanitation Plans on Service Provision: Evidence from
Brazil”, investigates non-technological methods of increasing access to improved water
and sanitation (WS) in developing countries. In particular, it presents evidence of the
efficiency gains that can be achieved in municipal water provision through the act of
formulating and carrying out basic sanitation plans. I exploit the staggered roll-out in im-
plementation of basic sanitation plans throughout municipalities in southern Brazil from
2007-2013. I find that, in the three years after the enactment of sanitation plans, munici-
palities increased the efficiency of their respective water systems through the tightening
up of “leakages" in the system, both in terms of water distribution and bill payment.
However, I find no significant increases in the degree of individual access to the systems,
suggesting that in the relatively short-run, providers focus on improving the existing sys-
tem as opposed to building out new infrastructure.
Chapter 3, “(Not So) Gently Down The Stream: River Pollution and Health in Indone-
sia”, addresses the fact that waterborne diseases are the leading cause of mortality in
developing countries. We emphasize a previously ignored cause of diarrhea - upstream
river bathing. Using newly constructed data on upstream-downstream hydrological link-
ages along with village census panel data in Indonesia, we find that upstream river
bathing can explain as many as 7.5% of all diarrheal deaths. Our results, which are net
of avoidance behavior, show no effect of trash disposal on diarrheal infections. Further-
more we find that individuals engage in avoidance behavior in response to trash disposal
(visible pollutants) but not river bathing (invisible pollutants). We conduct policy simu-
lations to show that targeting upstream individuals could generate substantial environ-
mental and health savings relative to targeting downstream individuals. This provides
a potential road map for low- and middle-income countries with limited resources for
enforcement of water pollution.
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The Buck Stops Where? Federalism and




In many countries, multiple levels of government share responsibility in the provision
of public goods. There exists a large debate on the proper role of these various levels of
government (Bardhan 2002; Besley and Coate 2003; Hulten and Schwab 1997; Oates
1999, 2005). Some papers argue for central government provision of such services, citing
efficiency gains from economies of scale and internalization of cross-jurisdictional
spillovers (Dur and Staal 2008; Inman and Rubinfeld 1996; Oates Wallace 1972). Others
argue for a more decentralized framework, pointing out that local governments may be
more knowledgeable of and responsive to local conditions (Faguet 2004; Oates 1994;
Rubinchik-Pessach 2005).
However, this debate assumes that the level of government in charge of provision is
clearly defined; little is known about situations when there is ambiguity regarding
which level holds the ultimate authority for service provision. More precisely, there have
been few studies on instances when it is unclear which level of government holds the
residual rights of control and authority in the sector. One way this can occur is if the
legal infrastructure is sufficiently vague in delineating the roles of government. This
situation can arise in the weak institutional environment of some developing countries,
where the legal infrastructure is not as developed (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson
2002; Bardhan 2002; Gray 1997).
This paper examines how legal ambiguity in the role of different levels of government
can lead to systematic underinvestment in public utilities. I study how this institutional
uncertainty may lead to a threat of expropriation of operational authority between
different levels of government. I find that expropriation risk can cause sub-optimal
investment into public goods provision. Consequently, any reform that strengthens
residual control rights would lead to an increase public sector investment.
To study this, I consider a 2005 legal reform in Brazil that clarified the relationship
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between municipal and state governments in the water and sanitation (WS) sector. Prior
to the legislation, the WS sector was a patchwork of overlapping providers, with some
municipalities electing to self-provide service through municipal companies, while other
municipalities contracted these services out to their respective state WS company. This
arrangement was legally tenuous, with multiple attempts in the late 1990s and early
2000s by state governments to takeover municipal WS services. Bill 5.296 was
introduced to the Brazilian Congress in 2005 and established the local municipality
governments as the ultimate authority in WS provision within their jurisdictions. This
bill was approved by Congress and became National Water Law 11.447 in January 2007.
In order to causally identify the impact of this legislation on investment in the WS
sector, I exploit the variation in municipalities’ WS provider type in a
difference-in-differences (DID) framework. While some municipalities provided their
own WS services through self-owned utility companies, others contracted these services
to their respective state service provider. I utilize an administrative, municipality-level
panel dataset of the Brazilian WS sector (2001-2012) to compare municipalities that
self-provide WS services with those that contract these services to the state-run
companies before and after the legislative change.
I find that legal reform that eliminated the threat of expropriation by state companies
led to an increase in investment in the WS networks of municipality-run companies,
nearly doubling the level of total investment after 2005. This investment was primarily
funded by two sources: debt-driven finance (e.g. loans from development banks) and
company self-financing. Post-legislation, municipality-run companies saw significant
growth - relative to municipalities that contracted for these services to state companies -
in their WS systems, as well as in miscellaneous network resources (e.g. office buildings,
vehicles, computer systems). All of these increases are statistically significant.
In order to more distinctly identify the removal of expropriation as an underlying
mechanism driving these results, I run multiple extensions of the main result based on
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the pre-reform probability of expropriation. Those self-run municipalities that were
relatively richer, more politically autonomous, and in metropolitan areas were more
likely targets of a state takeover of WS services. I stratify the results by whether a self-run
municipality was a more likely target for state expropriation, and I find that these
municipalities showed a larger post-reform increases than other self-run companies.
I also run robustness checks to address potential concerns over time-varying
unobservables, timing of the legislation, and existence of spatial interdependence. The
results of the paper are robust to inclusion of state-specific time trends and definition of
the reform year. The results are also robust to two methods to control for spatial
correlation: the “buffer zone" approach and the use of a spatial error model.
Moreover, this increase in investment by municipality-run companies led to increases
in system access for residents. Two years after the reform, self-run municipalities saw a
significant increase in the number of connections to the WS network, as well as increases
in the average total length of both networks. The increase in average network length
represents a 6.3% and 16.3% growth, respectively, for municipality-run WS companies.
The water and sanitation sector is an ideal setting for the analysis, as it is significantly
more capital-intensive than other public utilities, with large up-front fixed costs in
network infrastructure that is long-lived (Hanemann 2006). Moreover, investment in the
WS sector in developing countries trails dramatically those of developed ones (Duflo,
Galiani, and Mobarak 2012). A large increase into the infrastructure of WS networks can
lead to significant increases in health and other important socio-economic outcomes.
This paper contributes to the literature on fiscal and environmental federalism.
Whereas much of this work has focused on competition and coordination between the
same level of government on issues such as taxation (Epple and Zelenitz 1981; Keen and
Kotsogiannis 2002; Rauscher 1998; Sitkoff and Schanzenbach 2005), education (Alesina,
Baqir, and Hoxby 2004; Brasington 1999; Hoxby 2000), and environmental resources
(Hatfield and Kosec 2015; Kunce and Shogren 2005; Sigman 2005; Woods 2006), this
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paper analyzes the vertical competition between higher and lower levels of government.
While some papers do consider the vertical competition aspect of federalism (notably
(Berry 2008), (Breton 2006), and (Liesbet and Gary 2003)), this paper’s contribution is to
study the role that incomplete property rights can have on the dynamics between the
various levels of government.1 This paper points to the importance that unambiguous
delineation of the level of government authority has on public goods provision.
This paper also contributes to the literature on incomplete contracts, property rights,
and the residual rights of control that follows in the tradition of (Coase 1960) and
Grossman-Hart-Moore (Grossman and Hart 1986; Hart and Moore 1990). This broad
literature provides evidence on the positive impacts of the strengthening of property
rights on investment decisions, for example from the household unit (Besley 1995; Field
2005; Galiani and Schargrodsky 2010). Most of the papers on incomplete contracts and
investment decisions that include the government usually model the government’s
interaction with fully private firms or via “public-private partnerships" (Besley and
Ghatak 2001; Hart, Shleifer, Vishny, et al. 1997; Hoppe and Schmitz 2010; Martimort and
Pouyet 2008). This is similarly true for those papers that look at investment decisions
under the threat of government expropriation, such as (Chen and Yeh 2013; Shleifer
1994). This paper departs from this literature in that the government expropriation takes
place within the different levels of government, as opposed to with outside firms. This
paper likewise departs from the general literature on firm investment under uncertainty
(Bloom, Bond, and Van Reenen 2007; Vatiero 2015) as public utility companies are likely
to differ from their private counterparts in their underlying objective function and may
not be purely profit-maximizers.
1. The paper most closely related to this one is (Estache, Garsous, and Motta 2015). In that paper, they
study the role that electoral outcomes and political alignment between the governor and mayors of munic-
ipalities in Sao Paolo has on sanitation services in the state. Their framework derives from the principal-
agent model and relies on the split mandate in sanitation authority, with municipalities in charge of sani-
tation provision, and the state in charge of surface water pollution control. (Lipscomb and Mobarak 2016)
analyze how decentralization can negatively impact water quality in the presence of negative externalities,
and this comparison is done on the same government level across Brazilian municipalities.
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Finally, this paper contributes to our understanding of the role of weak institutions on
development. Much of the previous work highlights the role that weak institutions play
in undermining economic development through corruption (Banerjee et al. n.d.; Ferraz
and Finan 2011; Olken 2007), historically extractive policies (Acemoglu, Johnson, and
Robinson 2001; Dell 2010), and so-called “weak" state capacity (Acemoglu 2005; Besley
and Persson 2009; Dell, Lane, and Querubin 2015). However, few papers have studied
the mechanism by which weak institutions has on intra-governmental dynamics - the
notable (and partial) exception being the paper by (Acemoglu, García-Jimeno, and
Robinson 2015) that study the network effects of state capacity building between the
local and national governments in Colombia. My analysis of intra-governmental
expropriation risk documents a novel way in which a weak institutional environment
can undermine the ability of well-intentioned governments to provide important public
goods and services.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 provides background on the
institutional structure of the Brazilian WS sector and briefly describes the proposed
sector reforms of the early 2000s. A theoretical framework to motivate the empirical
findings of the paper is presented in Section 1.3. Section 1.4 describes the data and
Section 1.5 discusses the empirical identification strategy. Estimation results, robustness
checks, and extensions of the main empirical findings are presented in Section 1.6, and
Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 BACKGROUND
1.2.1 Brazilian WS Sector
The water and sanitation (WS) sector in Brazil is characterized by the existence of
both municipal- and state-level entities responsible for service provision. This shared
responsibilities by different levels of government is not observed in other utilities in
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Brazil, such as electricity and telecommunications.2 Even across the WS sector, this type
of power-sharing arrangement between different levels of government public companies
is not observed in comparable developing country settings.
The distinctive structure of Brazil’s WS sector has its origins in the Federal policy
mandates of the late-1960s and early-1970s. In the middle of the 20th century, water and
sewerage services (where available) were provided locally by municipal-level
governments - a fact that was acknowledged in the 1967 Federal Constitution, which
endowed responsibility for water and sewerage provision to the municipalities.
However, Brazil’s military government in the late-1960s attempted to centralize
operational authority to state-level administrations3. This policy culminated in the
creation in 1971 of a national plan for WS provision known as PLANASA (Plano Nacional
de Saneamento). PLANASA created 27 state companies (Portuguese: Companhias Estaduais
de Saneamento Basico, aka CESBs) - one for each state - that would be responsible for
providing basic water and sanitation services.
The underlying argument for the creation of the CESBs as a replacement for local,
municipal service provision involves concerns over efficiency in the sector. Many
proponents of PLANASA pointed to the fact that WS service exhibits a cost structure of a
natural monopoly, and municipal companies of a small scale could not efficiently
provide service at low costs. Also, having the operational authority held at the
state-level would make it possible for cross-subsidization from wealthier municipalities
to finance infrastructure and service in poorer areas of the state.
While PLANASA created the state WS companies, it could not abolish
municipal-level companies, due mainly to the ambiguous language in the 1967
Constitution with regards to the ultimate holder of operational authority in the sector.
Rather, federal and state governments pressed municipalities to enter into concession
2. See (Tupper and Resende 2004)
3. See (Heller 2007)
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contracts with the CESBs, and cede operational control in the sector to state companies.4
While many municipalities signed on with the state companies, a significant number did
not, deciding to keep WS provision through municipality-run companies. Figure 4.1
shows the break-down of Brazilian municipalities by type of provider.5 Approximately
60% of all municipalities joined PLANASA, with the remaining 40% providing service
via local companies.
The resulting institutional structure created legal ambiguities and debate over which
level of government should be the ultimate holder of the residual control rights in WS
provision. Compounding this informal situation was the fact that many concession
contracts that municipalities had with the state companies were informal and or never
explicitly signed. Frictions between state- and municipal- governments led to a climate
of uncertainty for municipal-run companies with an ever-present threat of expropriation
by the CESBs.6 This friction between state and municipal providers led to the creation in
1984 of the National Association of Municipal Sanitation (ASSEMAE). This organization
consists of over 1,800 municipal WS companies whose mission is to protect the
operational authority of municipalities in the sector, as in the case of the attempted
expropriation of the municipality of CampinasâĂŹs WS company (Sanasa) by the state
of Sao Paulo (Costa et al. 2007).
Even with the abolition of PLANASA in 1992 and a new Federal Constitution in 1988
that provided language in support of municipal authority, the environment of legal
ambiguity between the roles of state and municipality persisted. Additionally, the Public
Concession Act of 1995 created more legal uncertainty in the area of public service
4. One of the stated benefits to help induce municipalities to enter into agreements with state companies
is the fact that only CESBs had authorization to obtain financing via the National Housing Bank (Por-
tuguese: Banco Nacional de Habitacao). See (Sabbioni 2008)
5. The state of Mato Grosso had a state WS company (SANEMAT) that was created in 1966, however it
was dissolved in 1998 and all operations were given back to the municipalities. For that reason, Mato Grosso
has no state company observations, and is removed from this paper’s analysis. For more information, see:
http://www.cosama.am.gov.br/
6. See (Britto and Silva 2006) for a more detailed discussion of the conflict between municipality-run and
state-run WS companies, particularly in urban areas.
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provision by contesting the long-term concession contracts with the CESBs that were
inherited from PLANASA. This resulted in multiple lawsuits and an increased call for
reform to the institutional framework of the sector.7
Two such lawsuits occurred in the late 1990s, as both the states of Bahia and Rio de
Janeiro attempted controversial reforms that would have ceded authority to their
respective state WS companies (McNallen 2005). In 1999, the state legislature of Bahia
attempted to alter a substantial number of articles in its state constitution. Among these
alterations, the legislature attempted to fully transfer ownership of all WS services from
the municipalities to the state company. Similarly, the state legislature of Rio de Janeiro
passed Complementary State Law No. 87 in 1997, which created the Rio de Janeiro
metropolitan region and Lagos micro-region. Furthermore, it granted the state company
(CEDAE) complete authority of WS operations in these newly-defined areas, and
attempted to expropriate the services of all self-run municipalities therein.
Both of these legislations faced stiff opposition from pro-labor organizations - the
Workers’ Union in Bahia and the Democratic Workers’ Party in Rio de Janeiro. In both
cases, the opposition filed suit in the Federal Supreme Court, claiming that that laws
were unconstitutional and that the 1988 Constitution granted the authority of service
provision to municipalities. Due to the backlog of cases awaiting decisions from the
Court, neither of the above cases have been decided. Even if timely decisions were
rendered, however, as the Brazilian legal code is based in the “civil law" tradition,
neither decision by the court would have set precedent and fundamentally altered the
legal architecture of the WS sector (McNallen 2005). Rather, any far-reaching attempt
reform the property rights institutions of the sector would have to come from the
legislative branch.
7. See (Sabbioni 2008).
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1.2.2 2005 Legal Reform
Following a landslide victory in the 2002 national election, the administration of the
newly elected President Lula da Silva made improvement in the WS sector a high
priority (Heller 2007). From a retrospective letter in the 2006 Human Development
Report (Nations 2006):
In Brazil we have been attempting to address the water and sanitation
problem as part of our broader drive to create a more just, less divided and
more humane society. We have been making progress. ... new legislation will
make the utilities that provide water service more accountable to the people
they serve.
... Clean, accessible and affordable water is a human right. It is also one of the
foundations for economic and social development. Strengthening these
foundations is not always easy: it takes political leadership and it costs
money. But failing to invest political and financial capital today will carry the
high price of lost opportunities for social progress and economic growth
tomorrow.
The administration submitted a reform to the Brazilian legislature with the goal of
strengthening the WS sector’s regulatory framework. The drafted proposal - Bill 5.296 -
entered Congress in 2005 as an attempt to resolve the conflicts of jurisdiction between
state- and municipal-level WS companies, as well as to define the role of the federal
government in the sector.
While Bill 5.296/2005 contained many proposed changes to the WS sector, there are
two reforms that directly relate to and altered the shared power-structure of the previous
systems.8 First, the bill explicitly and unambiguously designates the municipal
government as the conceding authority in the sectors of water provision, sewerage
treatment, and solid waste collection. In this, Bill 5.296 was seen as a reaffirmation and
clarification of Article 30 of the 1988 Brazilian Constitution, and for the first time
explicitly stated in legal terms that water and sanitation issues were inherently those of a
“local interest" (Assembly 1988).
8. See (Motta and Moreira 2006)
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Second, the bill provided a legal structure for the relationship (i.e. concessions
contracts) between the municipal- and state-level governments in this sector, in the case
of those municipalities that do not provide these services themselves and rather cede
this operation to state companies.
The bill was approved by Congress in January 2007 as National Water Law
11.447/2007, and was the first ever federal law that addresses the WS sector (Castro and
Heller 2012).
1.3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
This section provides a simple framework to conceptualize the relationship between
municipal and state companies in the WS sector. The purpose of this section is two-fold.
First, it highlights the fact that some municipalities would be better off self-providing
WS services instead of contracting them out to the state company. Furthermore, it
provides conditions and intuition on which municipalities would chose to self-run WS
service. Second, it informs the key empirical observation of the paper: in the presence of
a threat of expropriation by the state company, municipality-run companies will find it
optimal to under-invest in their WS systems. It follows that once the risk of
expropriation is eliminated, there will be an increase in investment by these self-run
municipal WS companies.
1.3.1 Basic Set-up of the Framework
At the center of the framework is the difference in optimizing decisions by the state
and municipal WS companies. The basic framework has two main components:
• The objective of the municipal company is to maximize the utility of a
representative citizen, and the objective of the state company is to maximize the
weighted utility of the representative citizens in each of the municipalities in its
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jurisdiction.9,10 The citizen’s utility depends on the amount (W) of services
provided in the WS sector.11
• The model has 2 periods, with the respective company choosing W in both periods.
The company also chooses a network investment level (I) that is deducted from
Period 1’s discretionary budget and reduces the per-unit cost of providing W in
Period 2.
In the next sections, I solve the optimization problem faced by the municipal-level and
state-level companies, respectively. I then compare the service and investment decisions
for the two companies and derive conditions under which certain municipalities would
be better off providing these services themselves. The conditions that make these
municipalities better off via self-provision will also make them attractive to
expropriation by the state company. Therefore, I then look at the investment decision of
these municipalities under the risk of service expropriation by the state-level companies
in period 2. By comparing investment levels of municipality-run WS companies in the
first-best case and in the case with expropriation risk, I am be able to make a prediction
on the effect that a ambiguity-reducing legal reform will have on investment decisions.
1.3.2 Service and Investment Decisions
1.3.2.1 Municipal WS Company
The municipal company chooses the level of service in the WS sector in each period
(W1, W2) to maximize the utility of a representative citizen. It also chooses a level of
investment (I) to devote to the network in the first period that reduces the per-unit cost
9. There is evidence that social welfare is a large component of the WS sector in Brazil and it is not
purely motivated by profit maximization. For example, Sao Paulo’s state WS company (SABESP) has a
Code of Ethics and Conduct established in its company charter that defines sustainable development, social
responsibility, and welfare improvement as guiding principles of its operations.
10. As another example of non-profit-maximizing behavior of Brazilian WS companies, many compa-
nies, such as the provider for Pôrto Alegre implement so-called "social tariffs" that heavily discount initial
amounts of water consumption for low-income households, schools, and other charitable organizations.
See (Viero and Cordeiro 2003)
11. One can think of W in “quality-quantity” units
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of providing W2. Let the citizen’s utility have the functional form U(·) = log(·).12
Mathematically, the optimization problem faced by the municipal company is:
max
W1,W2,I





where Y1 and Y2 are the discretionary budgets for the municipal company in the two
periods. The cost of providing these services is represented by a generic cost level, c.
This per-unit cost in period 2 is decreasing in the level of investment (I) that was chosen
in period 1. Period 2 utility is weighted by a discount factor δ ≤ 1.
Solving this constrained optimization problem results in the optimal level of





This investment level is increasing in the size of the Period 1 discretionary budget and
decreasing in the size of the inter-temporal discount factor.
1.3.2.2 State WS Company
Like its municipal-level counterpart, the state company’s objective is to maximize the
utility of its representative citizens by choosing the optimal level of services and
investment for the 2 periods. The state-level problem differs, however, in that the state
company maximizes the weighted utility of the representative citizen in each of the n



























12. This functional form allows the framework to be more tractable, however the implications of the
model holds under greater generality.
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Where (Wj, Ij) are the levels of services and investment devoted to municipality j by the
state company. The coefficients µj are the pareto weights that the state assigns to each
municipality in its jurisdiction, with ∑nj=1 µj = 1. The state company’s total discretionary
budget (Ȳ) is composed of the total of the respective municipality budgets: Ȳ1 = ∑nj=1 Y1j
and Ȳ2 = ∑nj=1 Y2j.
Equating the first-order conditions for two different municipalities i and j and
combining these conditions with the budget feasibility condition in period 1 yields the









Where Y1i is municipality i’s component to the state company’s first period budget, and
is equivalent to Y1 in the municipal company case of Section 1.3.2.1. Note that the level
of investment that the state company devotes to municipality i is a function of not only
the municipality’s own budget and discount rate, but it is also dependent on the
municipality’s budget and pareto weight in relation to all of the other municipalities in
the state. This point will be discussed further in the next section.
1.3.2.3 Comparing Investment Decisions by Municipal and State WS Companies
I now compare the optimal investment decisions made by the municipal-level and
state-level companies to derive conditions under which a municipality would
investment more into its WS network if it ran it, rather than ceding the residual rights of
control of this system to the state.
For a given municipality i, the individual municipal investment in the WS network
would be larger than the analogous investment level chosen by its state-level company if:






















This indicates that municipality i would receive less investment in its network from
the state if the sum of the relative pareto weights of the other municipalities in the state
is greater than the sum of the other municipalities’ relative budget components to the
state company’s first period discretionary budget. This condition is likely to be satisfied
when µi is small and Y1i is large - that is, municipalities that have very little weight when
the state company optimizes its citizen’s utility, but has a large amount of resources that
contribute to the state budget. This implication supports the observation by (Castro and
Heller 2012) that it was the richer, higher HDI municipalities that were more likely to
choose in the late 1960’s to provide their own WS services and not cede these operations
to the state water companies. Further evidence is provided by (Rezende 2005), who finds
that these municipalities were also more politically autonomous than those that
contracted service to the state.
The above comparison provides an interesting insight on the relationship between
state and municipal companies; it suggests that the direction of expropriation is upward.
That is, any move toward expropriation would come from a state company, as it could
then take the larger resources from the rich municipalities and redistribute it to other
municipalities in which it places a higher pareto weight. Furthermore, self-run
municipalities would fear the loss of authority in their WS networks, as any
expropriation would decrease citizen welfare.
1.3.2.4 Municipal Level Investment Under Threat of Expropriation
Lastly, I study the decision of those municipalities that satisfy the condition found in
Section 1.3.2.3, which are better off by self-providing WS services and are attractive to
state companies for expropriation. In this case, however, I’ll introduce the threat of
expropriation, wherein the municipal system can be taken over and incorporated into
the state company’s operations in period 2. I’ll analyze how the introduction of this
uncertainty affects the investment decision (I) of the municipal WS company in first
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period.
The optimization problem is analogous to the one in Section 1.3.2.1, except that in this
scenario there is a probability, p, that the state company can expropriate the
municipality’s WS services (and all of its residual control rights) in period 2. If the state
expropriates the municipal system, then it will only allocate an investment level ĪiS < IM
to the municipality.13 It will also provide a level of service W̄ i2,S ≤W2,M, with the
remaining part of municipality i’s period 2 budget being redistributed to other
municipalities within the state. In this scenario, the municipal company will choose (W1,




















In this scenario, the municipality’s optimal choice of investment in its WS system is a
function of the probability of expropriation. Moreover, since p ∈ (0, 1), we have two
results of interest:




∂p < 0 : A municipality’s optimal investment level is a decreasing function of the
probability of expropriation
Intuitively, a municipal company under a threat of expropriation would choose a
lower investment level and would prefer to defer these resources to first period utility, as
13. For example, it can take many of the investments that municipality i made in the previous period (such
as automobiles, computer systems, etc.) and physically reallocate these to other municipalities within the
state’s jurisdiction. The state company could also link the municipality’s WS network to the larger state
network in order to use its water and sewerage facilities for water that would be used by other municipali-
ties.
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it cannot fully benefit from the investment that pays off in the later period.
The above framework presents the main result of the paper: a municipality will
optimally under invest in it’s WS system when there exists a fear of expropriation by the state
company, and investment levels in these systems should increase once this expropriation threat is
removed.
1.4 DATA
I use three administrative datasets that have the municipality as the unit of
observation and are linked through the unique, 7-digit administrative code.
Information on the water and sanitation sector comes from a dataset provided by the
Brazilian Ministry of Cities (Portuguese: Ministério das Cidades). This dataset provides
basic information and performance indicators on water and sewerage service at the
municipality level. Thus for those municipalities that contract out these services to state
companies, the dataset provides information for those parts of the system that operate
within the municipality boundary.
The Ministry of Cities provides this data on a yearly basis starting from 1995,
however the earliest rounds of the data are not standardized and compatible with later
years, and I therefore restrict the period of analysis to the years 2001 to 2012.
The main dataset includes data collected on the investments in the WS sector
according to either the destination or the origin of these resources. All of the data on
investments is disaggregated to the municipality level, which is the unit of observation.
This means that the investments recorded for a municipality whose service is provided
by a state company includes only those investments made by the company that are used
in the service of residents within the given municipality boundaries.
The categories for the origin of yearly investment are investment financed by “Own”
Resources, so called “Onerous” Resources, and “Nononerous” Resources. “Own” Resources
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investment is defined to be all investment made by the WS utility from it’s own
resources - through service collections, non-operating income, sale of stock to
shareholders, etc. “Onerous” Resources are those resources for which the service provider
services through paid loans which are returnable through depreciation or interest. Those
loans generally come from agreements with Brazilian federal banks, external
development banks (such as the World Bank), and other financial institutions.14 All
other investments that come in the form of non-repayable government funds and grants
are categorized as “Nononerous” Resources.
The destination of the investment can be one of three types, depending on the final
use of the resources. Investment in Water are all investments taken by the service provider
for all equipment and facilities that are directly involved in the service of water
provision (e.g. water lines, treatment facilities). Similarly, Investment in Sewer is defined
as the value of all investments held by the service provider in equipment and facilities
built into the sewerage system. A third category exists - Investment in Other - for all
investments of the service provider that are of general use and not directly related to
either the water or sewerage systems.15
The final category for investment included in the dataset is Total investment. This
category is the total of all of the investments made by the service provider in a given
year. It can be calculated as either the sum of the“origin" investment or the sum of the
“destination" investments, as these two quantities are necessarily equal.16
Additional information on municipality characteristics comes from a dataset derived
from annual surveys conducted by the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística
(IBGE). This dataset comprises various socioeconomic indicators for all of Brazil’s
14. Examples of Brazilian federal banks include BNDES, CAIXA, and CEF
15. Examples include office buildings, computer systems, maintenance vehicles, etc.
16. There is an additional term - capital expenditure - that is defined as expenses incurred by the service
provider in a given year for capitalizing the costs of projects that have not yet been incorporated into the
appropriate investment classification. It does not have a significant economic interpretation and is primarily
an accounting term that is used such that the sum of the destination classifications plus capital expenditure
equals total investment.
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municipalities on yearly basis. Indicators include information on municipal finances
(e.g. municipal GDP, taxes, gross value added) and resident populations for every year
of the study period, 2001-2012.
One of the robustness checks presented in Section 1.6.2 exploits the spatial variation
of the municipalities throughout Brazil. To run this analysis, I utilize a geospatial
mapping of Brazil’s municipality administrative boundaries, which comes from the
IBGE’s BCIM v304 mapping library. This library contains a GIS file of all of Brazil’s
municipalities with 2000 as the reference year. Along with the coordinates of the
municipalities, it also provides the 7-digit administrative code that allows me to link this
spatial dataset to the other datasets provided by the Ministry of Cities and the IBGE.
1.5 EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
The primary objective of this paper is to determine what effects the strengthening of
the residual rights of control has on investment in public goods. The framework in
Section 1.3 predicts that any policy reform that eliminates expropriation risk by state WS
companies should lead to an increase in investment in the WS sector for those
municipalities that provide their own services.
To estimate this causal effect, I employ a difference-in-differences (DID) strategy -
comparing the investment levels of municipalities that provide WS services themselves
against those municipalities that contract them out to a state company.17,18 I compare
these investment levels for the years before the proposed policy reform and for the
17. An important point in running the DID strategy is the validity of the state-run municipalities as a
“control" group. In the empirical setting, the control group must not be “treated" by the reform, so the
state-run municipalities should not be affected by the reform’s elimination of the expropriation risk. The
fact that these state-run municipalities are already serviced by the state companies implies that they ceded
the operational authority in this sector - either through formal contracts or de facto by the daily operations on
the ground - to these state companies. Thus even before the reform, the state-run municipalities’ probability
of expropriation was zero and any legal reform that decreases risk of state takeover should not effect this
group. Therefore as a first-order effect, the legal reform differentially affected the self-run and state-run
municipalities.
18. Some may consider the reform to strengthen the rights for all municipalities. However, if that was the
case, then the DID coefficient would provide an underestimate of the effect of the reform.
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subsequent years. By differencing out the pre- and post-reform investment levels of the
state-run municipalities, I am able to identify and estimate any increase in investment
for self-run municipalities that is due to the decrease in legal ambiguity and
expropriation risk between different levels of government.
The estimating equation I run is:
ymt = α + γm + λt + δRe f ormmt + X
′
mtβ + εmt
The dependent variable, ymt, are the various investments in the WS system of
municipality m in year t. There are seven investment levels used in the dataset and are
described in greater detail in Section 1.4.
I use the timing of the proposal of Bill 5.296 as the measure of the “pre-" and “post-"
treatment periods. The variable Re f ormmt is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 for all
observations in which the WS system of municipality m is run by a municipal company
for all years t after the proposal of Bill 5.296 in Congress. The associated coefficient (δ) is
the main coefficient of interest and is interpreted as the increase in investment by
self-run municipalities after the introduction of the congressional reform. As the goal of
this legislation was to reduce ambiguity between state and local governments in WS
provision, Section 1.3.2.4 predicts that this coefficient should be positive and significant.
I use the year of proposal rather than approval because the reform of the WS sector
was a primary policy concern for the administration of the widely-elected President Lula
da Silva. Given the administration’s support of the initiative, the bill’s passage was very
likely. This is further evidenced by the fact that the bill eventually did pass Congress to
become National Water Law 11.447 in January 2007. Moreover, since WS systems require
large and lengthy investment schedules, confidence in the bill’s passage and a future
elimination of expropriation risk would spur investment by the self-run municipalities
at the time of the Bill’s proposal.
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To increase the precision of the estimate, I use municipality and year fixed effects - γm
and λt, respectively - instead of the “treatment" and “post" dummy variables found in
the standard difference-in-differences regression.
For added controls in the estimating equation, I include a vector of municipality
characteristics, Xmt, such as municipality m’s yearly population. To control for the fact
that municipalities differ in income, I include variables on municipal finances, such as
municipal gdp, taxes, gross value added (gva).19 All of these variables are taken in log
form. The specification also contains municipality and year fixed effects.
To correct for issues that arise due to general autocorrelations in the DID setting, as
discussed in (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004), the error term - εmt - is estimated
with robust standard errors that are clustered at the municipality level.
The estimation covers the period for which I have available data, 2001-2012. The
paper also restricts the empirical specification to observations for which there are
observations in the “pre-" and “post-" periods, although the findings in Section 1.6 are
robust to the inclusion of the unbalanced municipalities, as can be seen in the
Appendix.20
1.6 RESULTS
This section investigates how the investment strategies for different types of WS
companies changed as a result of the 2005 reform that strengthened the residual rights of
control for self-run municipal companies and eliminated the threat of expropriation by
the state company. In particular, this section displays the main finding of the paper: once
the risk of expropriation by state companies was eliminated, municipality-run WS
19. There may be concerns that the municipal finance variables - especially taxes - may be “bad controls”
if taxes are raised to help finance the increased WS investment. However, my findings are robust to the
exclusion of these controls, as shown in Appendix Table A.2.
20. Appendix Table A.1 provides evidence on municipality characteristics and the year of first observation
in the sample. While, on average, self-run municipalities enter into the sample later, the main results is
robust to the inclusion of the full sample, as shown in Appendix Table A.3.
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companies significantly increased the level of investment into their networks. I further
provide evidence of the strengthening of the residual rights of control as an underlying
mechanism by studying the heterogeneity in investment decisions by self-run
municipalities. This section will present robustness checks of the main result, taking into
account the possible spatial component of the WS sector. Lastly, I extend the analysis to




We will first look at the graphical results of the impact of the legislative change, and
Figure 4.2 through Figure 4.8 show the raw data on the investment decisions of the WS
companies by type for the period 2001-2012.
Figure 4.2 presents the yearly means of total investment in the entire WS system for
the two types of companies (i.e. municipality- and state-run companies). There are two
important features of Figure 4.2. First, the yearly trend of pre-reform investment levels
by the two types of companies are fairly comparable. The average yearly investment of
municipality-run companies is higher than state-run ones in the period 2001-2004, which
corroborates a key insight from the theoretical framework in Section 1.3: those
municipalities that are richer and more developed would choose to self-provide and
have higher levels of network expenditure. Crucially for the DID framework, the
parallel trends assumption appears to hold, in that although municipality-run
investment levels are higher, both types of companies display the same trend prior to
2005, with investment levels staying generally steady from year-to-year.
The second key feature of Figure 4.2 is the sharp increase in investments made by
municipality-run companies after the proposal of Bill 5.296 in 2005. This increase in total
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investment by municipality-run companies is large, with the 2012 investment level being
approximately 5x the pre-reform investment levels.
I decompose this increase in total investment by both its source and destination.
Figures 4.3-4.5 show the yearly investment levels for “own", “onerous", and
“nononerous" sources, respectively. As with Total Investment, municipality-run
companies have a large and dramatic increase in investment from own and onerous
resources after the introduction of the reform. For both of these types of sources, the
parallel trends assumption is even more strikingly satisfied, and there is little discernible
post-reform increase in investment for their state-run counterparts. As both types of
investment sources are costly to the WS company - either by forgoing service
expenditure in the current period or servicing the debt in a later one - this pattern is
consistent with the prediction made in theoretical framework that investment levels
would rise if the expropriation threat from state companies was eliminated.
A similar post-reform increase in investment for self-run municipalities does not
appear in investments that comes from “nononerous" government grants, as seen in
Figure 4.5. Rather, the amount of yearly government grants seems to be distributed
equally for both types of municipalities, as their investment levels co-move throughout
the period of analysis. However, there is a large increase in investment for both types of
municipalities starting in 2007. This is likely due to a new federal initiative called the
“Program for the Acceleration of Growth" (PAC), that was pushed as a policy priority by
the administration of President Lula da Silva in 2007. This program called for large
increases in federal funding for major infrastructure projects (e.g. ports, highways,
energy, WS networks) throughout Brazil. This new program also explains the slight
increase in Total Investment for state-run municipalities after 2007 that is observed in
Figure 4.2.
Figures 4.6 through 4.8 show the average yearly investment for municipalities by
company type for the possible investment destinations. There are significant increases in
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investment for self-run municipalities after the reform in all aspects of the WS network:
in water (Figure 4.6), sewer (Figure 4.7), and miscellaneous network investments. In
these three investment categories, both self-run and state-run municipalities display
parallel trends in pre-reform investment levels.
The effect in both the water and sewer networks are attenuated by the fact that
state-run municipality investment increases after 2007, as a result of the federal PAC
program. Consistent with this explanation is the lack of increased investment in the
miscellaneous aspect of the state-run networks, as these types of investments (e.g.
computers systems, office space) are not related to the visible infrastructure of WS
provision and so were not a priority for the federal grants via the PAC. Moreover, the
sharp increases in investment by self-run municipalities between 2005-2007 cannot be
explained by the introduction of PAC, and are strong evidence for causal impact of the
2005 legislation that eliminated the expropriation risk for these companies.
1.6.1.2 Empirical Results
Table 4.1 presents the regression results using the differences-in-differences
specification outlined in Section 1.5. Each column of the table correspond to Figures 4.2
to 4.8, respectively.
Estimates from the table show that the empirical specification closely matches the
plots of the raw investment data. The causal impact on investment in the WS networks
from the introduction of Bill 5.926/2005 is positive and significant for investment types
save those of Nononerous Investment. The yearly average of Total Investment by
municipality-run companies was approximately 2.3 million Reals from 2001-2005, which
implies a causal impact of over 100% increase in total investment for these companies
after expropriation risk was eliminated. Similar comparisons of the change in Own
Investment and Onerous Investment show an increase of by 72% and over 550%,
respectively. As Total Investment can be decomposed into its various sources, one can
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determine that the increase in Total Investment as a result of the legal reform is split
roughly 40-60 in increase from Own and Onerous sources.
The right-most three columns of the table display the coefficient of interest for the
investment destinations, and correspond to Figures 4.6 through 4.8. After the proposed
reform, there were large and significant increases in investment across all aspects of the
WS network for municipality-run companies. The coefficients on investment in the
water and sewer networks are less statistically significant and are likely attenuated due
to the introduction of PAC in 2007, which increased investment in these network for
state-run municipalities as well.
The largest investment increases occurred in the sewer network. This result is
reasonable, as the sewer network incurs high fixed costs of operation, and sewer
coverage lags behind water coverage across Brazil, implying higher rates of return to
investment in this sector. Post-reform increases in the water, sewer, and miscellaneous
network investments by municipality-run companies correspond to an approximately
80%, 170%, and 100% increase, respectively, from pre-reform yearly averages.
1.6.1.3 Heterogeneity in Investment Decisions
The previous two sections showed evidence of a link between the 2005 reform that
strengthened residual control rights for self-run municipalities and subsequent increases
in their network investment. In this section I provide additional evidence of the
strengthening of control rights and elimination of expropriation risk as an underlying
mechanism of the reform. To do this, I study the heterogeneity in investment decisions
by self-run municipalities across three dimensions that differentially affect a
municipality’s optimal investment decision, as shown in the theoretical framework in
Section 1.3. These dimensions are the a priori probability of expropriation by a state
company, a municipality’s relative income, and its political autonomy from the state
government.
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The theoretical framework predicts that, under threat of expropriation, self-run
municipalities with a higher probability of being expropriated by the state company
would invest less in their WS network. Moreover, once this expropriation risk is
eliminated, these municipalities would have a larger increase in investment than their
counterparts.
To test this prediction, I split the analysis by whether a self-run municipality is within
IBGE-designated metropolitan areas. An earlier bill21 was proposed in Congress in 2001
with the aim of clarifying the roles of the different levels of government in the sector.
The bill would have given the conceding authority for WS provision to the state
companies, but this reform would only have extended to municipalities within
metropolitan areas (Intelligence 2001). While this bill did not pass Congress, its proposal
along with pushes towards metropolitan consolidation of services implies that those
self-run municipalities within metro areas faced a higher and more enduring
expropriation risk from the state. Table 4.2 presents the post-reform investment
decisions by whether a self-run municipality belongs to a metropolitan area or not. The
table confirms the predication that across all investment types, those self-run
municipalities in metropolitan areas have larger and more significant increases in
investment after the removal of the expropriation risk.
Section 1.3.2.2 derived the optimal investment that a state company would allocate to
municipality i, which is a function of the municipality’s income relative to other
municipalities in the state, as well as its relative pareto weight µi. The relative size of
these two values would determine how attractive a given municipality would be to a
state company in expropriating its operational authority. Thus municipalities with high
relative GDP would be more attractive as the state company could then redistribute
these large resources to other municipalities in its jurisdiction. Likewise, municipalities
that are more “politically autonomous” from the state (i.e. low µi) would allow the state
21. Bill 4.147/2001
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to redistribute the municipality’s resources to localities that are more aligned with state
control (Rezende 2005). Both of these observations imply that municipalities with high
relative income and political autonomy would be the more likely candidates for
expropriation, and would thus have larger post-reform increases in WS network
investment.
To test the prediction on municipality GDP, I split the empirical analysis into
municipalities with “High" and “Low" shares of state GDP. All self-run municipalities
with a share of their respective state’s GDP greater than 1% (constituting ≈ 30% of the
sample) are classified as having a high share of GDP, while all others are classified as low
GDP share municipalities. Table 4.3 presents the results of the main specification by
share of state GDP. Consistent with the above intuition, those municipalities that
comprise a high share of state GDP have larger and more significant post-reform
increases across all types of WS investment than the low share municipalities, even after
controlling for income level.
I use the results from the 2004 municipal elections to study the heterogeneity in
post-reform investment by political autonomy. As municipal and state elections
alternate every two years, voters in the 2004 election made their decision for mayor with
full knowledge of the political party of both the state legislature and governor. Also, the
2004 election occurred a full year before the proposal of Bill 5.926, and it is unlikely that
voters would have taken this future legislation into account when voting for mayor.
Thus the result of the 2004 municipal election and whether the party of the mayor
aligned with the governor or not is arguably a quasi-exogenous indicator of a
municipality’s autonomy from the state government.
I use this result to look at the decisions of self-run municipalities whose election
resulted in a mayor of the same party of the governor against those where there was not
political alignment. The results are presented in Table 4.4. Self-run municipalities in
which the mayor was not aligned with the governor’s party as a result of the election
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had larger and more significant increases to their WS networks after the reform. This
finding supports the notion that municipalities that were more autonomous from the
state government - and thus more likely to have reduced investment if under the control
of the state WS company - had a larger impact on investment decisions once the
expropriation risk was removed.
All three of the previous tables provide evidence that the elimination of expropriation
risk by the state company was an underlying mechanism that resulted from the reform.
On average, self-run municipalities increased the investment into their WS networks
after the reform, and it is those municipalities that faced the higher uncertainty over
expropriation risk that had the largest causal impact of the reform.
1.6.2 Robustness Checks of Main Result
In this section, I perform robustness checks to the main results from Table 4.1. These
robustness checks address possible concerns over the preferred specification presented
in this paper.
One concern is that the use of municipality and year fixed effects may not be
capturing any time varying changes in characteristics of the state and municipalities. To
address this, I run an alternative specification using municipality fixed effects and a
state-specific time trend, shown in Appendix Table A.4. The regression results in this
specification are similar to those in Table 4.1, both in magnitude and significance for the
non-attenuated investment categories. The investments that had the largest attenuation -
water and sewer decrease in magnitude and lose their marginal statistical significance. I
ran a similar regression employing municipality specific time trends, however these
results are very non-significant. I attribute this to the fact that with a large number of
municipalities, imposing a specific time-trend for each “soaks up" nearly all of the
meaningful variation between the self-run and state-run municipalities.
Another potential concern is the timing of the legislation. While the bill was proposed
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in Congress in 2005, it was finally ratified as National Water Law 11.447 in January 2007.
While there is a clear increase in investment from self-run municipalities starting in 2005
(and argued earlier in the paper as significant policy push by the Lula administration),
one may think that the threat of expropriation was not fully removed until the bill
became law. I run another DID specification in which Re f ormmt is equal to 1 for all years
t after the passage of the law in 2007. Results of this specification are shown in Appendix
Table A.5. The coefficients are comparable in magnitude and significance to the
coefficients from the main specification. The coefficient for Investment in Water and
Investment in Sewer are smaller in magnitude, with the water coeffcient losing its
statistical significance. This result matches the observation that the federal PAC
program, which targeted these highly visible infrastructure projects, was also introduced
in 2007, and thus attenuated the difference in investment levels between self-run and
state-run municipalities.
While the main specification’s use of robust, clustered standard errors, year fixed
effects, and controlling for time-varying municipality conditions help to mitigate issues
regarding serial autocorrelation, the largest concern to the causal estimates presented so
far is the presence of spatial correlations.
The presence of potential spatial correlations is particularly relevant in this setting, as
the construction and operation of water and sewerage networks can be greatly affected
by geographic conditions. For example, the type and presence of different water sources
(e.g. surface water, groundwater, under river flow) will dictate the amount and type of
investment needed in the local water system. Soil and ground conditions will also affect
the method and cost of installation of water/sewer pipes and other underground
facilities. These examples and others suggest that the amount and types of investments
made by WS companies could be clustered in certain geographic regions.
Moreover, the interconnected nature of a water and sewer network give further
support to the increased possibility of spatial correlation among municipalities within a
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small geographic cluster.
While the empirical specification in Section 1.5 includes spatial fixed effects and
standard errors clustered at the municipality level, this may not be enough to remove
the spatial dependence (Anselin and Arribas-Bel 2013). In order to address the possible
spatial correlation more directly, I employ two different empirical strategies: creating
buffer regions and using the spatial error model (SEM).
The first strategy to control for spatial correlation is to only compare those
municipality with state-run WS companies that are geographically near municipalities
that provide their own WS service. This strategy is similar to (Heckert and Mennis 2012)
and should compare only those treatment and control groups that have similar (and
unobserved) geospatial characteristics.
To run this approach, I calculate an exterior boundary buffer for all self-run
municipalities using an 3rd-level administrative map provided by the IBGE. These
buffer regions are of varying distances which are defined to be all areas within the
designated distance from any point along the municipality’s geographic boundary. For
each given buffer distance, I then only include those state-run municipalty’s that are
(weakly) within the buffer zone.22 Once the control group of CESB municipalities is
generated, I run the same estimating question as before.
Table 4.5 shows the estimation results for four buffer distances: 10km, 25km, 50km,
and 100km. The results are very similar to the coefficient estimates in Table 4.1 in both
magnitude and significance. Moreover, these estimates become larger and more similar
to the main result as the buffer zone increases.
The second approach I take is to explicitly structure the error relationship using the
spatial error model (SEM).23 In this model, I construct a error weighting matrix E using
the inverse-distance rule of spatial dependence. That is, municipalities that are closer to
22. Note that a municipality with CESB service may be in multiple buffer zones, and the control group is
then the set of all state-run municipalities that are in at least one buffer region.
23. This approach is similar to the one employed by (Dubé et al. 2014)
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each other will have great spatial dependence, and this dependence decays at a rate of
the inverse of the distance between the two. Formally, the estimating equation is:
ymt = α + βMuniCom + δRe f ormmt + γs + λt + Z
′
mtθ + εmt,
νmt = λEνmt + εmt
where λ is the spatial error coefficient, εmt is a vector of uncorrelated error terms, and
E is the spatial weighting matrix, with the property that for municipality i and
municipality j with associated distance between them of distij, the ij entry of E is given
by Eij = 1/distij.
As in the main specification, δ is the coefficient of interest, with its interpretation
identical to that in Section 1.5. Due to limitations in the non-linear estimation, this
specification includes state fixed effects (γs) and thus requires the dummy variable
MuniCom that is equal to 1 is municipality m’s WS network is run by a municipal-level
company.24 The vector of controls, Zmt, includes time-varying muncipality
characteristics.
Table 4.6 shows the estimates of the result of the legislative reform on investments
using the SEM specification. We see that the main findings of the paper are robust to the
use of a spatial error structure, with the estimates of the effect of Bill 5.296 on the
investment decision of municipality-run companies to be of similar magnitude and
significance.
1.6.3 Access to WS System
I also study whether this increase in invest by municipality-run WS companies had
any effect on network service or access. I employ a modified version of the
24. The sem regressions were run using the SPMLREG program in Stata12. See (Jeanty et al. 2013).
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difference-in-differences empirical strategy outlined in Section 1.5, with the year
indicator variable being defined as two years after the proposal of Bill 5.296/2005 in
Congress. This two year lag is taken to account for the time needed for investment
projects begun after the reform to become active and enter into network use.
Table 4.7 displays the results for access to the water and sewer network. Access to the
water network is measured by several variables available in the dataset that is presumed
to have a direct impact on the number of potential users of the water system. The
variables include information on the number (and type) of connections to the system, as
well as the overall length of the water pipe network.
We see from the table that the increase in investment by municipality-run WS
companies resulted in significant increases in the number of water connections across all
types, with strong significance in metered connections (columns 3 and 5). The increased
investment levels also lead to a significant increase to the length of the water networks
pipes, although the magnitude of this increase represents a modest growth of
approximately 6.3% compared to pre-reform average water network length for self-run
municipalities.
The bottom panel of Table 4.7 shows corresponding results for variables related to
access of the sewer system. This table displays a similar pattern to that of water access,
with significant increases across all types of sewer system connections. The increase in
sewer network length represents a larger 16.3% increase from average pre-reform levels.
1.7 CONCLUSION
This paper seeks to illuminate the role that ambiguity in intra-governmental relations
can have in public resource provision. Using an administrative panel dataset on the
Brazilian water and sanitation sector, I find that legal reforms which strengthen residual
property rights and decrease expropriation risk between the various levels of
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government have large impacts on investment in public utilities. Results suggest that
post-reform, municipalities with self-run, local WS companies almost doubled their
network investment. Moreover, this increased investment was funded by both debt and
self-financing. I find evidence that this increase in investment led to an increase in access
to the WS system in these municipalities. I also find evidence that this increased
investment resulted in increased access to both the water and sewerage networks.
By incorporating the literature on incomplete property rights into the work on
federalism and public goods provision, this paper provides insight on an alternative
policy tool that can be used to increase investment in this crucial welfare sector. The
evidence in this paper suggests that, rather than large scale, capital-intensive investment
campaigns by federal governments and international agencies, countries can focus on
passing legal reforms to strengthen property rights among governmental stakeholders.
This institutional reform can achieve similar increases in investment in public goods.
Moreover, a strong institutional framework would help maintain the large scale
investments from conventional outside sources, as any large-scale investment without
the accompanying decrease in intra-governmental expropriation risk would have
sub-optimal maintenance strategies by the operating authorities.
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Chapter 2
The Role of Basic Sanitation Plans on
Service Provision: Evidence from Brazil
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2.1 INTRODUCTION
Providing access to improved sources of water and sanitation (WS) is a first order
concern for individual health, welfare, and quality of life. This is particularly salient in
developing countries, where inadequate drinking water and sanitation cause
approximately 502,000 and 280,000 diarrheal deaths a year, respectively (WHO 2014).
Researchers are increasingly studying the underlying mechanisms and policies to most
effectively provide access to these vital services in developing countries, with a focus on
consumer’s willingness-to-pay, collective actions problems, information dissemination,
public financing, and the role of elected officials (Duflo, Galiani, and Mobarak 2012).
In this paper, I consider an alternative method to improve WS services - namely, basic
sanitation plans. Through this method, WS companies asses current system conditions,
and explicitly document the short, medium, and long-term goals for service
improvements, as well as the planned actions to be taken to achieve these targets. The
use of basic sanitation plans provides a non-technological method for potentially
increasing WS services that does not require large public funds for the financing of
infrastructure projects. Moreover, as the creation of these plans is the responsibility of
the service providers, it nominally should not be influenced by the problems of
collective action and political interests.
To study whether the act of explicitly creating and implementing a plan for basic
sanitation policy can cause real improvements in service quality and access, I consider
the 2007 Brazilian national water law that mandated the creation of these plans for all
municipalities. A portion of this law standardized the minimal aspects of the plans for
which all service providers must be in compliance. Crucially, the law gave latitude to the
WS companies to tailor these plans to the specific conditions of their jurisdictions, and
did not legislate a date for plan implementation.
I exploit the variation in the timing of implementation of basic sanitation plans to
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document the correlations and impact of these plans on service efficiency and access. I
utilize an administrative, municipality-level panel dataset of the Brazilian WS sector
(2007-2013) to compare municipalities’ performance before and after plan
implementation. Measures for efficiency and degree of access come from standardized
indexes provided by the national system of sanitation information, and included index
of water “loss" in the system, as well as the number of consumer per km of water pipe
and number of connections.1
I observe a significant increase in the efficiency of the WS systems several years after
the enactment of the basic sanitation plan. This efficiency gain comes from the limiting
of “leakages" in the system, both in water that is lost via distribution as well as
unrecouped costs from the non-payment for billed water. I find that those municipalities
that implemented basic sanitation plans during the period 2007-2013 had on average a
12% decrease in water distribution loss and 25% decrease in billing losses after the third
year since implementation. However, I do not find analogous evidence that basic
sanitation plans increased household access to the WS system. One possible reason for
the presence of significant efficiency gains but not of access in the WS system is that it is
easier to initially “plug the leaks" in the current infrastructure than it is to find the
resources for the large fixed costs necessary for infrastructure expansion. Thus it is
possible that increases in access may be a longer-term goal that would not be realized
until at least a decade after enactment of the sanitation plans, and would also not be
observed during the study period of this paper.
This paper most generally contributes to the growing literature on policies that can be
used to increase both quality and access to improved water sources. Whereas much of
the literature focuses on the demand side’s willingness-to-pay for these services (Ahuja,
Kremer, Zwane, et al. 2010; Ashraf, Glaeser, and Ponzetto 2016; Devoto et al. 2012; Null
1. Other papers using performance indicators to measure WS efficiency include (Corton and Berg 2009),
(Lin 2005), and (Singh, Mittal, and Upadhyay 2014). For a technical discussion of the various methods for
measuring WS utility efficiency, refer to (Coelli 2003).
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et al. 2012), this paper presents a method by which the WS suppliers can internally adopt
policy to improve service. While the supply side aspect of improving water services has
also been studied, notably Galiani, Gertler, and Schargrodsky (2005)’s analysis of the
gains from privatization in Argentina’s water sector, no papers - to the best of my
knowledge - have studied the role of planning and implementation of basic sanitation
policies on WS firm performance. This paper provides evidence of another potential
approach that policymakers can take in achieving universal access to improved water
sources.
As I study the non-technical causes of efficiency differences in a sector producing a
homogeneous good (i.e. improved water and sanitation) in a developing country, this
paper closely parallels Bloom et al. (2013)’s study of management styles and productivity
of Indian firms. This comparison becomes particularly salient if one considers the
creation and implementation of a municipality-specific, overarching plan for operations
as a type of “managerial technology" that WS companies utilize to achieve universal
access and improved service while minimizing operational costs. The framework to
study the relationship between management style and productivity among large, public
firms has been applied in Bloom et al. (2015)’s study of English public hospitals, and
studying similar phenomenon in the water and sanitation sector is a natural extension.
Moreover, understanding how the creation of a plan to utilize existing systems to
achieve efficiency gains is particularly useful for basic sanitation policy, as most gains
from technology or added infrastructure incur very large upfront costs.
Finally, this paper contributes to the literature specifically concerned with efficiency
of the Brazilian water and sanitation sector. Numerous aspects of the Brazilian system
and their effects on efficiency have been studied, such as public vs. private ownership
(Souza, Faria, and Moreira 2007; Motta and Moreira 2006), state vs municipal control
(Ferro et al. 2014; Sabbioni 2008), and regional heterogeneities (Tupper and Resende
2004). The role and effectiveness of regulatory reform in improving efficiency has also
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been studied, such as Carvalho and Sampaio (2015)’s analysis that found productivity
gains by operators between 2006 and 2011, but also found that non-regulated companies
had higher efficiency scores during this period. This paper is the the first to document
that role that basic sanitation plans as a result of the 2007 national water had on
operational efficiency of WS providers in Brazil.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides background on the legislation
concerning basic sanitation plans. Section 2.3 describes the data and Section 2.4
discusses the empirical identification strategy. Estimation results are presented in
Section 2.5, and Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 BACKGROUND
Since the formation of a national water and sanitation plan (PLANASA) in 1968, basic
sanitation policy in Brazil has been characterized as a gradual change towards service
improvements, albeit with large asymmetries in quality and access throughout the
country (Heller 2007). Responsibility for service improvements lay with the individual
state and municipal providers, whose discretion in management led to heterogeneities in
the long-term planing and day-to-day operations of WS systems.
Despite earlier attempts to create a new national framework for basic sanitation
policy, no centralized standard for service provision existed until the passage of National
Water Law 11.445 in January 2007.2 The purpose of the law is to address the deficiencies
in service and create guidelines for provision at a national scale, and was the first ever
federal law that addresses the WS sector (Castro and Heller 2012).
National Water Law 11.445 addresses numerous aspects of the WS sector, including
system ownership, the role of the federal-level government, and scope of regulations.
Most important for this paper, the law legislates the creation of a basic sanitation plan at
2. A particulrly notable attempt at WS sector reform occurred in 1994 with Parliament’s approval of a
new law regulating the sector. However, this law was eventually vetoed by President Fernando Henrique
Cardoso.
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the municipality level, and attempts to standardize the approach that WS service
providers take in organizing system operations.3 The inclusion of legislation concerning
planning represents a significant departure from the ad hoc approach that providers took
prior to this, with many providers never explicitly having or documenting the plans for
service improvements.
The primary objective of the basic sanitation plans outlined by Law 11.445 is for
improvements in operational efficiency and universal access. While each service
provider is responsible for the creation of a basic sanitation plan specific to the given
municipality, the law legislates several guidelines towards achieving these objectives
with which the plans must comply. These recommendations include an initial period for
assessment of current service conditions and causes of weakness, the creation of short,
medium, and long-term goals and targets towards achieving universal access, systematic
assessments of service efficiency, and the creation of actions towards achieving these
goals. Crucially, the law mandates that each municipality have a plan regarding basic
sanitation, but does not explicitly set a date for which these plans have to be enacted,
giving service providers latitude in when they put these plans in force.
2.3 DATA
The primary source of data on the Brazilian water and sanitation sector comes from
the Ministry of Cities (Portuguese: Ministério das Cidades) through the National
Sanitation Information System, known as SNIS. The SNIS dataset provides basic
information and performance indicators on water and sanitation service at the
municipality level on a yearly basis.
The key variable for the empirical strategy discussed in Section 2.4 is the year of
implementation of basic sanitation plan. For each municipality, the dataset contains
3. For those municipalities that contract WS services to a state company, the state is responsible for cre-
ating a plan for each municipality for which it has operational authority.
39
information on the status of the basic sanitation plan (e.g. no plan, in progress, enacted),
the start month and year of when the plan was enacted, as well as the term for which the
plan is valid. While the information of municipal sanitation plans is only available in the
2009, 2012, and 2013 rounds of the SNIS, any sanitation plan with a start year in between
these rounds would be documented in the next available dataset, making it possible to
impute the start year for all municipalities between 2007 and 2013.4 The study period of
2007-2013 is from the earliest possible year that a sanitation plan could be implemented
to the latest year for which there is verifiable data on the status of plan implementations.
Unfortunately, the 2014 version of SNIS - the most recent round available - does not
contain information on basic sanitation plans, and is thus excluded from the study
period.
Within the rounds of the SNIS with data of basic sanitation plans, many of the states
do not have any available data on the status of the municipal planning. Due to this
limitation, the study sample is restricted to municipalities in the four southernmost
Brazilian states: Paraná, Rio Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina, and São Paulo. These
contiguous four states belong to the richer and more developed region of Brazil, and are
politically, economically, and culturally similar. The study sample consists of 1,794
municipalities across the 7 year period, accounting for approximately one-third of the
total number of municipalities in Brazil.5
This paper focuses on eight indicators to measure efficiency and access to the
municipal WS system. The first four sets of indicators relate to measuring the “leakages"
of a water utility and are standard measures for efficiency in the public utilities
literature. They are the Distribution Losses Index, Connection Losses Index, Gross Linear
Losses Index, and Billing Losses Index. The first 3 indexes measure the losses between the
4. Some municipalities in the sample do not have information on the status of their sanitation plans
available, and if they cannot be imputed from later rounds of the SNIS, then they are not included in the
study.
5. The breakdown of municipalities by state is 398 in Paranà, 475 in Rio Grande do Sul, 292 in Santa
Catarina, and 629 in São Paulo.
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water produced by a WS company and the amount consumed by end-users, of the total
volume produced, the number of active connections in the system, and the length of the
water network, respectively. The Billing Losses Index measures the amount of water that
is produced and flows through the systems for which the company does not recoup the
billed costs of use. The other four indicators relate to the degree of access that
municipality residents have to the water network. These measures are the volume of
water received per household, the percent of a municipality’s urban population with
access to the central water system, the length of the water network per connection
within the system, and the number of active households per connection. Summary
statistics for these eight variables are shown in Table 4.8. If the implementation of basic
sanitation plans has a positive effect on WS company performance, then one would
expect the losses indexes to decrease over time, and the access indicators to increase.
Additional information on municipality characteristics comes from a dataset derived
from annual surveys conducted by the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística
(IBGE). This dataset comprises various socioeconomic indicators for all of Brazil’s
municipalities on yearly basis. Indicators include information on municipal finances
(e.g. municipal GDP, taxes, gross value added) and resident populations for every year
of the study period, 2007-2013. In addition, voting data for the 3 relevant rounds of
mayoral elections (2004, 2008, 2012) comes from the Superior Electoral Court.
2.4 EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
The empirical analysis exploits the quasi-experimental variation across municipalities
and years in the timing of the implementation of basic sanitation plans. The equation to
estimate the effect of sanitation plans on improvements in water utility performance is:
Indmt = α + βPlanmt + γ′Xmt + λm + µt + εmt (1)
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Indmt is the log value of the various performance indicators for municipality m’s WS
company in year t. In this paper I focus on eight indicators on a water company’s
performance: four types of efficiency loss indexes and four statistics to measure the
relative access to the WS system by municipal residents.
The key regressor - Planmt - is an indicator for whether a basic sanitation plan is in
effect (including the initial year of ratification) for municipality m in year t. Xmt is a
vector of time-varying municipality characteristics, including information on
population, mayor’s political party, size, metro area status, type of WS company (i.e.
state-run or municipality-run), municipal gdp, taxes, and gross value added for the four
main sectors of the economy: agriculture, industry, services, and administration. To
increase the precision of the estimate, I include municipality fixed effects (λm) and year
fixed effects (µt). The main coefficient of interest is β, which measures the effect of basic
sanitation plans on WS company performance. The error term - εmt - is estimated with
robust standard errors that are clustered at the municipality level, to correct for issues
that arise due to general autocorrelations in the panel data setting, as discussed in
(Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004).
The identifying assumption for the empirical strategy is that the municipality-year
variation in timing of implementation of the basic sanitation plan is uncorrelated with
other time-varying - but unobserved - determinants of the outcomes of interest. By
including both time and municipality fixed effects, I control for all of the time-invariant
municipal characteristics, as well as overall time trends that may be correlated with the
outcomes. Furthermore, by including a vector of time-varying characteristics at the
municipality level, I attempt to make the set of unobserved time-varying characteristics
small, albeit not irrefutably empty.
While the identifying assumption is inherently untestable, I conduct an indirect test to
check if it is a plausible assumption to make. In Table 4.9, I regress the first year that the
basic plan was in effect by the complete set of time-varying municipal characteristics
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that I use in the vector of controls. Column 1 presents the regression using the entire
sample of municipalities, while columns 2-5 runs the regression separately for the four
states. With the exception of a single variable column 2, all of the coefficients are
statistically insignificant.6
There are reasons to believe that there may not be an observable effect of basic
sanitation plans on service performance for the first few years after enactment of the
plan. As discussed earlier, Article 19 of National Law 11.445/2007 provides a rough
guide for the structure, timing, and implementation of the sanitation plans. In particular,
it stipulates a baseline assessment of municipal conditions, with gradual planning for
the implementation of short, medium, and longterm goals. Given the time necessary to
asses and formulate service improvements, significant decreases in the service loss
indexes may not appear until at least two years after the plan enactment.7 Thus the main
estimating equation that I use throughout the paper is a modified version of Equation
(1):
Indmt = α + β0 Initialmt + β1Firstmt + β2Nextmt + γ′Xmt + λm + µt + εmt (2)
In this specification, the dependent variable, vector of controls, fixed effect, and error
term are identical to Equation (1). The difference is that Indmt is split up into three
separate indicator variables that correspond to different periods of the post-plan phase.
Initialmt is an indicator that is equal to 1 if year t is the initial year that the WS company
in municipality m enacted a basic sanitation plan. Firstmt indicates if municipality m is in
the first three years after the initial enactment year, and Nextmt is equal to 1 if year t is one
of the next three years (i.e. years 4-6) that the basic sanitation plan is in effect in
6. It should be noted that the specification is not strongly robust to the inclusion of a municipality specific
time trend. As shown in Appendix Table A.6, the point estimates are not statistically significant and smaller
than the preferred specification, although the null hypothesis that the estimates are similar in magnitude
cannot be rejected at a 95% confidence level.





Figures 4.9 through 4.12 plot the coefficients and 95% confidence intervals of the
event study estimation of the Equation (1). The plotted coefficients correspond to the
indicators for the k years before or after the enactment of a basic sanitation plan in
municipality m, relative to the year before the plan (k = 1). The plots range from six years
before to six years after the official ratification of the sanitation plans.
Each figure corresponds to one of the four loss indexes that measure system efficiency,
as discussed in greater detail in Section 2.3: Distribution Loss Index, Connection Loss Index,
Gross Linear Loss Index, and Billing Loss Index. Across all four figures, there are no
statistically significant trends in the decrease in system loss for the periods before the
implementation of basic sanitation plans. The lack of statistically significant pre-trends
in the event-study graph adds support to the validity of the identifying assumption that
the year of implementation for a given municipality is exogenous. Furthermore, the
identifying assumption implies that municipalities would have had similar trends in
efficiency loss indexes absent the implementation of basic sanitation plans.
There appears to be a slight downward trend in the loss indexes for the first few years
after the basic sanitation plan was enacted by a given municipality. However, the
coefficients associated with the first fews post-treatment years are not statistically
significantly different from zero. These years correspond to the period for which
National Water Law 11.445 prescribed a baseline assessment of current WS operations
and the targeting for short-, medium-, and long-term goals. In the next three years after
the establishment of a basic plan, however, there is a marked decrease in system
leakages across all for figures. Moreover, these decreases are both statistically and
economically significant.
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Table 4.10 presents the regression results associated with the event-study figures. As
discussed in Section 2.4, the table presents the modified estimation equation to account
for the delay in real changes to service operation after the initial assessment and
planning period. Column (1) of the table indicates that from 4-6 years after the
enactment of basic sanitation plans, municipal WS companies had a nearly 12%
reduction in the loss of water distributed throughout the system. Columns (2) and (3)
show similar magnitudes of efficiency gains in gross linear loss (9%) and water per
connections (15%). The reduction in water that is produced, but whose cost is not
recuperated through proper billing is even greater, with a 25% reduction in billing losses
after the third year of the plan’s enforcement. All of these declines are statistically
significant, while there appears to be no significant change in these loss index for both
the initial year and first three years of the post-plan period.
The first four columns on Table 4.10 include those municipalities that enacted basic
sanitation plans in the period 2007-2013. In the next four columns of the table, I also
include in the sample those municipalities for which there is data that did not yet
implement their basic sanitation plans in compliance with national water law during the
study period.8 As these municipalities would not have non-zero values for the variables
of interest in the estimating equation, their presence in the regression controls for
underlying trends. The estimation results using the full sample are quantitatively similar
in both magnitude and significance to the coefficients in columns (1)-(4).
While not a direct threat to the validity of the identification strategy, there may be
institutional aspects that affect the precision of the estimation of the main results in Table
4.10. First, those municipalities that ratified their basic sanitation plans in the last quarter
of the year may not have their plans effectively in force until the following year. To
address this, I run the estimation equation with the “plan start year" as the following
year for those plans that were enacted in October, November, and December. The results
8. Although Chapter 4 of National Water Law 11.445 mandates the creation of a basic sanitation plan for
each municipality, it does not explicitly mention date for which the plans had to be in place.
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of this regression is shown in Appendix Table A.7, with the coefficients on the variables
of interest being quantitatively and statistically significantly similar to the preferred
specification. Another aspect is that some municipalities only enacted their respective
sanitation plans in the last couple of years during the study period, and thus were only
in the “assessment" phase of the plan and could not implement real changes to the their
WS systems. To compare the effect of only municipalities that were in the process of
implementing service reforms, I restrict the sample to municipalities that observations
for at least two years after the initial ratification of sanitation plans. These estimates are
found in Appendix Table A.8, and again are similar to the estimates in Table 4.10.
As Table 4.10 shows an increase in efficiency for water utilities - in terms of a decrease
in “system leakages" - after the creation of a basic sanitation plan, I now turn to
analyzing the other stated objective of the legislation on basic plans. Chapter 4 of the
national water law stated both an increase in system efficiency and universal access as
primary objectives in the creation of municipality-specific plans. To analyze the
magnitude of a sanitation plan’s impact on increasing universal access, I run Equation
(2) using various measures of system access as the outcomes. The four measures chosen
are standard metrics to analyze the degree of access to a WS system: volume of water
received per household, percent of a municipality’s urban population with system access, length of
the water network per connection, and number of active households per connection.
The results of the regression are shown in Table 4.11. Each column represents the
estimation of an measure of system access, going from the most system-wide metric
(column (1)) to the most micro-level measure of access (column (4)). Unlike the
estimated effects on loss indexes seen in Table 4.10, there appears to be no significant
impact of the implementation of basic sanitation plans on the degree of household access
to the WS system. Even more, the estimation results are at least an order of magnitude
smaller than the analogues coefficients of Table 4.10. The lack of significant increase in
system access holds for all post-plan periods, including the period 4-6 years after plan
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implementation, when one begins to see real effects in the tightening of system
“leakages". Moreover, there is no increase in access for any metric of household access to
the system, in both the sample of municipalities that implemented the plans (first four
columns) and the sample including municipalities that did not implement plans during
the study period (next four columns).
Taking these two sets of results, it appears that - at least in the first 7 years after the
passage of the national water law - the push for municipality basic sanitation plans
accomplished only one of its two stated goals. After an initial period of assessment and
planning for short, medium, and long-term targets, there is a significant decline in
system “leakages", both in terms of the amount of produced water that is unaccounted
for once it leaves the facility, as well as the amount of costs that are not properly
recouped through water billing. These decreases in loss indexes point to one aspect of
WS operations that become more efficient after the implementation of a plan for
improving services. However, there does not appear to be any real increase in universal
access to the WS systems after the start of the plans. One reason why there is an
observed increase is system efficiency but not of system access is that it is arguably easier
to “tighten up" leakages in the existing system than to build new infrastructure. Thus for
the relatively short amount of time after the enactment of the basic sanitation plan, the
short-term efficiency gains are easier to achieve, and the more longer-term expansion of
the WS system may not be observed in the short study period.
2.6 CONCLUSION
This paper presents evidence of the efficiency gains that can be achieved in municipal
water provision through the act of formulating and carrying out basic sanitation plans.
Exploiting the variation in timing of sanitation plan implementation by municipalities in
southeast Brazil, I observe a significant increase in the efficiency of the WS systems
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several years after the reforms. This efficiency gain comes from the limiting of
“leakages" in the system, both in water that is lost via distribution as well as unrecouped
costs from the non-payment for billed water. I find that those municipalities that
implemented basic sanitation plans during the period 2007-2013 had on average a 12%
decrease in water distribution loss and 25% decrease in billing losses after the third year
since implementation. The delay in the observed efficiency gains until after the third
year are most likely due to the first few years after plan implementation being dedicated
to system assessment and setting of short, medium, and long-term operational
benchmarks.
Despite the evidence of efficiency gains, I find no evidence that basic sanitation plans
increased household access to the WS system. As both increases in operational efficiency
and universal access were the primary objectives of the legislation governing the
creation of basic sanitation plans, this lack of real changes in the degree of individual
access can be seen as only a partial completion of the plan’s objective. One reason for the
presence of significant efficiency gains but not of access is that it is easier to initially
“plug the leaks" in the current infrastructure than it is to find the resources for the large
fixed costs necessary for infrastructure expansion. One should note that the study period
is relatively short, and it is possible that increases in access may not be realized until at
least a decade after enactment of the sanitation plans, when the longer-term goals of
municipal water companies can be implemented.
It is important to note that southeast Brazil is a relatively developed region of the
country, and any gains in operational efficiency may be smaller than WS systems in
lesser developed settings. As more municipalities in the north of Brazil begin to
implement basic sanitation plans, it will be useful to study the effects of these on
efficiency and access in the more rural and less developed region of the country.
More generally, this paper provides insight into an alternative method by which
policymakers can increase the efficiency of WS systems in delivering improved water
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sources to households. While large investment programs in infrastructure may increase
the amount of improved water resources to the population, creating a detailed plan of
targets to be met with the existing systems may have as large of an effect of delivery and
welfare. One possible direction for future work is to study the interaction between
technological improvements in service delivery and the plans and policies that are put in
place by WS companies to better utilize the existing resources.
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Chapter 3
(Not So) Gently Down The Stream: River
Pollution and Health in Indonesia
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3.1 INTRODUCTION
The objective of market-based environmental regulations is to internalize the social
cost of pollution in economic decisions. When exposure to, and damage from, a
pollutant is salient, measuring only the direct incidence of the pollutant and ignoring
compensatory behavior (e.g. air filters, water purifiers, etc.) can understate the true
social cost of pollution (Bartik 1988; Deschenes, Greenstone, and Shapiro 2012).
Individuals engage in such compensatory behavior when the marginal cost of avoidance
is less than the marginal benefit from reduced exposure to pollutants. However, this
duality between observed choice and experienced utility can break down when
exposure to certain pollutants is not salient, resulting in low avoidance behavior or
defensive underinvestment - even when such behavior can be welfare improving. This is
of particular importance in developing countries, where individuals routinely
underinvest in profitable and health saving technologies (Ashraf, Berry, and Shapiro
2010; Bryan, Chowdhury, and Mobarak 2014; Greenstone and Jack 2015; Barrett, Garg,
and McBride 2016). In such a context, an understanding of the nature and extent of
externalities as a result of these “silent killers" can increase the efficacy of regulatory
interventions designed to promote public health and environmental improvements.
In this paper, we consider the case of river pollution and resulting waterborne
diseases in Indonesia. In particular, we focus on diarrhea, which globally accounts for
more than 1.5 million deaths each year (WHO 2014). Freshwater pollution is of
particular importance in low- and middle-income countries where untreated river water
is routinely consumed, in part due to the low enforcement of policies intended to
prevent contamination.1 Earlier work in the area of freshwater pollution has focused
primarily on industrial waste disposal in rivers (Ebenstein 2012). We emphasize a
previously ignored and seemingly benign source of water pollution, in-river bathing,
1. Greenstone and Hanna (2014) find that while air pollution regulations had a measurable impact on
infant mortality in India, water pollution laws had no measurable effect.
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and show that it has a large welfare cost. We present three major findings: (1) upstream
river bathing in Indonesia can explain as many as 7.5% of all diarrheal deaths in a given
year, which over our four year sample translates to 865 diarrheal fatalities, (2)
individuals exhibit avoidance behavior in response to upstream trash disposal (visible)
but not to upstream river bathing (invisible) and (3) targeting upstream villages can
reduce diarrheal mortality by 57% more than would targeting downstream villages.
The challenge in causally estimating the impacts of river pollution on public health is
finding variation in river pollution that is exogenous to local health outcomes, and also
large enough to be economically meaningful. While researchers have previously
employed randomized designs in subsidies for provision of clean water (Ahuja, Kremer,
Zwane, et al. 2010; Kremer et al. 2011), to the best of our knowledge no one has used
experimental or quasi-experimental variation to study the impact of specific river
pollutants on local health outcomes.2 We fill this void in the literature by constructing a
novel data set of drainage basins in Indonesia to assign to each of the villages in our
sample their respective set of upstream and downstream villages from approximately
5.8 billion possible upstream-downstream hydrological linkages.
Using biennial village census data from 2000 to 2008 and employing village fixed
effects, we rely on the identifying assumption that year-to-year changes in upstream
polluting behavior are exogenous to downstream health outcomes, which is plausible
for two reasons. First, household level in-river polluting behavior in Indonesia is de facto
unregulated, minimizing the regulatory factors that could selectively drive household
pollution towards low-income villages. Second, we use data on upstream polluting
behavior rather than data on local pollution levels (Lipscomb and Mobarak 2016) or
official quality grades (Ebenstein 2012). As a result, we are not relying on correlating
local pollution with local health outcomes, which could be spurious for many reasons
2. The closest study to our work is Ebenstein (2012) who uses rainfall as an instrument for water quality
(and not polluting behavior or actual pollutant concentrations) at certain sites in China to study the impact
of poor water quality on digestive cancers.
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including but not limited to geographic (Tiebout) sorting. Instead, we rely on upstream
behavior that is plausibly exogenous to downstream health outcomes.
We test the validity of our identifying assumption and rule out geographic sorting
through a battery of placebo and falsification tests and find that for a given village,
bathing by upstream villages increases diarrheal incidence, while bathing by
downstream villages has no effect. Furthermore, we show that the effect is specific to
diarrhea (consistent with its waterborne nature), with no measurable effect on other
diseases. This rules out the existence of a spurious correlation between upstream
polluting and downstream health, as we would expect to see that manifest as a
significant impact between upstream bathing and at least one of the other diseases as
well.3 Importantly, while alternative explanations could exist for each of our results, we
believe there is no plausible alternative explanation that would rationalize all of our
empirical findings.
Our results are relevant for policymakers interested in reducing mortality from
waterborne diseases. Given the limited enforcement of water pollution in most low- and
middle-income nations, we identify sources of pollution that individuals fail to avoid
and crucially, where enforcement resources will be most effective. When large scale
government programs aimed at river basin cleanups are financially or technically
infeasible, policymakers could enact cost-effective prevention policies that could
substantially reduce diarrheal incidence; we show that a 1% reduction in the most
upstream decile’s river bathing activity reduces downstream diarrheal incidence by
2.54%.
The policy implications of our work are underscored by contributions to several
relevant research areas in economics. First, we build on the literature emphasizing the
estimation of causal impacts of environmental quality on human health, particularly in
3. The remaining threat to identification would be if individuals geographically sort across villages
within a province in our time frame in response to diarrheal outbreaks unrelated to upstream polluting
behavior, but not in response to outbreaks of malaria, measles, respiratory infections or dengue. That
seems unlikely.
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developing countries (see Graff Zivin and Neidell (2013) for an exhaustive review). The
construction of all riparian linkages between villages using a combination of geospatial
and hydrological techniques enables us to overcome previously identified data
limitations (Currie et al. 2014), and extend the research on the linkage between
environmental quality and human health to freshwater pollution. Our data construction
and identification method can generalize to other settings to understand downstream
externalities when the path of the pollutant determines the marginal social cost of
pollution.
Second, we contribute to the literature on consequences of water pollution (Leggett
and Bockstael 2000; Resosudarmo 2003; Dasgupta 2004; Ebenstein 2012; Currie et al.
2013), as well as strategies to reduce associated health consequences (Jalan and Ravallion
2003; Cutler and Miller 2005; Galiani, Gertler, and Schargrodsky 2005; Ahuja, Kremer,
Zwane, et al. 2010; Graff Zivin, Neidell, and Schlenker 2011). We are unaware of any
paper that isolates pollutants differentially on the basis of avoidance behavior, even
though such compensatory behavior has been documented in several instances
(Deschenes, Greenstone, and Shapiro 2012).
Third, we relate to a growing literature on the political economy of environmental
and natural resources (Burgess et al. 2012; Brollo et al. 2013). Our finding that targeting
individuals in upstream areas can generate much larger health savings than targeting
individuals in downstream areas is consistent with other work in this literature, such as
Lipscomb and Mobarak (2016), who show that within governing jurisdictions, water
quality is lowest in the downstream areas.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.2 we provide an overview of
water pollution regulation in Indonesia and the epidemiological evidence on the link
between river bathing and diarrhea. In Section 3.3 we describe the health and
demographic data used in this paper, as well as the construction of the
upstream-downstream village networks. Section ?? details the econometric strategy that
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we use and in Section 3.5 we discuss the empirical results. In Section 3.6, we simulate
different targeted moratoriums on river bathing and associated impacts on health
outcomes. Section 3.7 provides our concluding notes.
3.2 BACKGROUND
In this section, we provide a brief overview of the state of water pollution and
associated regulations in Indonesia to demonstrate that river pollution, particularly
originating from households, is de facto unregulated. We also provide evidence of the
epidemiological foundations on the impact of river bathing on water quality.
3.2.1 Water Pollution Regulation in Indonesia
Indonesia has made recent advances in environmental regulation, including the 2009
Environmental Protection and Management Law that recognizes the “serious problem"
of decreasing environmental quality, as well as executive actions designed to reduce
emissions and other forms of pollution (Nachmany et al. 2014). Yet, the regulation of
water pollution in Indonesia can be characterized as nominally mandated but not
regulated for some industries, and fully non-existent for others. Ostensibly, any
individual or business that purposely pollutes or otherwise damages water sources can
face imprisonment for up to 9 years and a maximum fine of 1.5 billion rupiah (USD
115,000), in accordance with Article 94 of Indonesia’s Law No. 7/2004 concerning water
resources. The provincial governments are responsible for the regulation and
supervision of all water resources, including rivers, that fall within their jurisdictions.
Despite the steep penalties for polluters, the quality of Indonesia’s water sources remain
low. Several studies including those by the Ministry of the Environment (MoE) found
that all 35 rivers that were tested across Indonesia were unsafe sources for drinking
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water (AECEN 2008).4
The most unregulated source of water pollution in Indonesia is household and
municipal discarding of sewage. Households routinely dispose of waste directly into
rivers, while the improper construction of municipal wastewater facilities leads to the
disposal of untreated sewage into river waters (Kerstens et al. 2013). Nearly two-thirds
of the Citarum River’s biological oxygen demand (BOD) comes from household
pollution, as compared to one-third from all industrial and agricultural activities
combined (Kerstens et al. 2013). Regulation of water pollution at the household level is
non-existent, with households polluting into lakes and rivers with de facto impunity.
Water pollution in Indonesia is also generated from industrial waste and agricultural
run-off (GWP 2013). Industrial polluting causes toxic materials such as heavy metals and
mercury to enter and poison drinking water sources. The 1989 Clean Water Program
(CWP), a government initiative to curb water pollution, achieved spotty reductions in
industrial pollutants with disproportionate success in East Java (Lucas and Djati 2000).
The mixed success of the CWP may be attributable to its enforceability, as the program
was designed to be voluntary (Bedner 2010) and water pollution regulations across
Indonesia generally do not apply to small firms and home industries (Braadbaart 1995).5
3.2.2 Implications of River Bathing
River bathing poses two major risks to human health, both of which are symptomatic
of diarrhea. First, riparian bathing increases the amount of free carbon dioxide (CO2)
and decreases the amount of dissolved oxygen (DO) in rivers (Bhatnagar and Sangwan
2009; Sharma, Bhadula, and Joshi 2012). Organic and biodegradable waste from the
bathers is decomposed by microbes that use oxygen and release carbon dioxide back into
4. In fact, the Citraum River has been found to be one of the most polluted places on Earth (Bernhardt
and Gysi 2013).
5. This is true for small scale industrial enterprises, as well as small and family-run farms, which account
for nearly a fifth of national GDP. In general, agriculture has been relatively less regulated than industrial
activity. For example, the Clean Water Program only applies to industrial firms and no counterpart has
been created for the agricultural sector.
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river water. This effect is amplified by the use of soaps and detergents that are absorbed
by aquatic flora. Higher CO2 levels drive phosphate and alkalinity concentrations,
which lead to river eutrophication. Consumption of water from eutrophic rivers has
been linked to gastroenteritis (WHO 2002) and cyanobacterial toxins (Scott et al. 1985;
Wu 1999), both of which can cause symptoms of intestinal pain, nausea, and diarrhea.
Second, river bathing can lead to an increased presence of coliform bacteria known to
cause nausea, vomiting, and bloody diarrhea, especially among infants and those with
compromised immune systems (Joshi and Sati 2011; Tyagi et al. 2013). Coliforms are a
large group of bacteria including total coliforms, fecal coliforms, and E. coli. The
presence of fecal coliforms and E. coli can come from both removing trace amounts of
fecal matter from the body during bathing, and from bathers (particularly infants)
defecating while bathing. Both of these types of coliforms are known to cause diarrhea.
3.3 DATA
In this section, we describe the health and demographic data, the geospatial methods
used to conduct the upstream and downstream assignment of villages along Indonesia’s
hydrological network, and the classification of each village into an identifiable drainage
basin.
3.3.1 Health and Demographic Data
The Indonesian statistical agency, Badan Pusat Statistik (BPS), conducts a biennial
census of all Indonesian villages known as Podes. Our sample consists of an unbalanced
panel of 32,107 villages6 over years (2000, 2003, 2006 and 2008) spread across all major
6. We have 25,894 villages in 2000, 22,952 villages in 2003, 28,041 villages in 2006 and 32,107 villages in
2008. We construct our key independent variable - upstream bathing - separately for each year, reducing
concerns over an unbalanced panel.
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Indonesian islands with the exception of Java.7 The census is conducted in a short span
of 4-6 weeks in October and November and consists of an exhaustive questionnaire to
which village heads respond.8 The census contains village-level information on health,
population, river location and other demographic variables.
3.3.1.1 Disease Data
The Podes is the most spatially and temporally expansive dataset on outbreaks and
resulting deaths from five major diseases: dengue, diarrhea, malaria, measles and
respiratory infections. In each year of the census, the village head is asked to report if
there was an outbreak of each of the different infections in that year. To the best of our
knowledge, the village head is not provided any instructions - such as a cut-off or a
point of comparison with respect to deaths or infections - in determining whether an
outbreak has taken place. As such it is entirely feasible that there were disease-driven
deaths in a given year that were unreported in Podes because the degree of spread was
not determined “high" enough to be considered an outbreak.
Therefore, we provide a number of checks on the accuracy of this ‘outbreak’ measure.
First, we use actual mortality data from Podes that is only available for 4681
village-years.9 In the appendix Table A.9, we show the outcomes using log mean death
rate per epidemic using the ‘outbreak’ variable and the log of actual death rate and show
that the results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar. With this validation, we
defer to using the outbreak variable since we have a larger number of observations over
a more geographically diverse area. This allows us to have power to provide better and
more nuanced estimates of the effect of upstream bathing on downstream health
7. Java, where the capital city of Jakarta is located, is the most densely populated island with an un-
usually high level of urbanization relative to the other islands. Additionally, Java has differential level of
enforcement of water pollution that we do not have the data to capture. We leave it as a future follow-up
exercise, and in this paper we focus on all other major Indonesian islands.
8. We are aware that some components of this information are verified at the sub-district or district offices
but we unfortunately do not have information of the precise sections of the survey that are verified.
9. We have 19,933 village-years but in practice only 4681 village-years where villages have more than
one year of data and therefore provide useful variation for our panel data approach.
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outcomes.
Table 4.12 provides summary statistics on the probability of village level outbreaks for
different diseases. Diarrhea is the second most prevalent disease in Indonesia after
malaria, and followed closely by respiratory infections. The mean incidence of the five
different diseases is statistically indistinguishable from one another (column 1). Diarrhea
is slightly more prevalent in hilly areas relative to flatter ones, and in rural areas relative
to urban settings. This geographic pattern of disease prevalence is consistent across all
diseases with the exception of dengue. The differences between these groups are small
and not statistically different from zero (columns 2 and 3).
3.3.1.2 Population and Demographic Data
We also obtain population and demographic data from Podes. In addition to village
population information, the census also contains information on whether a river passes
through a village, which we use to ground truth the hydrological river network data.
Podes also contains information on a range of socio-economic variables that we use for
robustness in our econometric strategy: dominant source of income in village,
geography of village, quality of governance (e.g. education of village head), access to
medical facilities in the village and political status of the village.
The dominant form of trash disposal (e.g. carry away, burnt, river polluting, other)
and bathing activity (e.g. in-river, other) is reported in Podes for each village. These are
binary variables, and unfortunately, the census does not contain information on the
number of individuals in each category. This necessitates the use of village populations
to construct our key explanatory variables: the number of individuals polluting in the
river through trash disposal and in-river bathing.
To create these variables, we replicate the following exercise for both trash disposal
and river bathing for both upstream and downstream aggregate measures, which we
illustrate by considering our main independent variable - upstream river bathing. For a
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given year t, village v, with nvt villages upstream along the river that passes through
village v, we define our key independent variable - the number of individuals engaging
in upstream river bathing as,
Upstreamvt = ∑
nvt
[populationnt ∗ bathingnt] (3.1)
where populationnt is the population of the ntht upstream village and bathingnt is a
binary variable which is equal to 1 if the majority of households in the village bathe in
the river in year t. We repeat this exercise for all downstream villages.
It is important to note that our independent variables could be either over- or
understated. Including all individuals as river bathers where only the majority of
individuals engage in river bathing likely overstates the number of individuals bathing
in rivers. However, excluding any individuals as river bathers in villages where less
than a majority of individuals bathe in rivers understates the number of individuals
bathing in rivers. The concern of unpredictable measurement error in our key
independent variables is addressed in our placebo tests in Table 4.15. Since we construct
our upstream and downstream variables in the same way, any bias should be present in
both, and given that the downstream effects are negligible we are confident that this is
not a source of bias in our results. Cautiously, we may interpret our results as the
differential impact of upstream bathing health effects net of downstream bathing health
effects. We find equivalence in the two interpretations due to the approximate null
effects of downstream river bathing.10
10. Another way to characterize our key independent variable described in equation (3.1) is as a scalar
multiple of the population weighted average of the number of villages where a plurality of households
engage in polluting behavior, with zero weight being assigned to villages where the dominant source of
bathing (or trash disposal) is not in the river.
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3.3.2 Construction of Drainage Basins Data and Assignment of
Upstream and Downstream Villages
Linking villages along a hydrological network enables us to track the impact of
upstream river bathers on downstream river users. Indonesia contains seven major
islands with relatively mountainous and high-elevation interiors that create a complex
hydrological network of streams and rivers. The official river network for the country
fails to identify minor waterways that are being used by villages for bathing, drinking
and trash disposal. Conducting a classic hydrological network analysis poses the risk of
failing to assign villages located along minor rivers to the river network, which may
understate upstream pollutant runoff (Figure 4.14).
Instead of tracing the hydrological network directly, we adopt a watershed approach
that identifies all upstream-downstream relationships within each basin using a high
resolution digital elevation model (DEM), and then determine on-river status using
survey data. Proprietary approaches to processing such a DEM are less adept to
managing canopy interference - where the presence of tree canopy is mistaken for terrain
- which could also render an underestimation of the number of upstream villages
connected topographically to a given downstream village. The problem of canopy
interference is compounded by the approximately 5.8 billion possible village
relationships across Indonesia.11
A high-resolution 30 meter void-filled DEM was used alongside village
administrative boundaries from Podes. A pour point was then constructed for each
individual village that self-reported being located on a river.12 The use of self-reported
locations in this way provides a means to “ground truth" our data to avoid
misclassifying on-river (type 1 error) and off-river (type 2 error) villages. The mapping
11. We manage canopy interference and computational processing constraints by developing a clustered
implantation of the r.watershed and r.water.outlet algorithms in GRASS GIS v7.
12. Each pour point identified the village’s maximum upstream catchment, which is bound by its drainage
basin.
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of all upstream and downstream village relationships was conducted independently for
each sample year (2000, 2003, 2006 and 2008) to accommodate the redistricting of
administrative units.13 The product of the hydrological analysis was a list of every
Indonesian village and its ordered upstream counterparts across the four sample years
(approximately 13.7 million upstream observations). The comprehensive nature of the
GIS output enables us to (1) calculate the relevant upstream and downstream pollutant
measures, (2) define all distinct drainage basins that represented the level of exposure to
river water pollutants, and (3) simulate geographically-targeted policy interventions.
3.4 ESTIMATION AND IDENTIFICATION STRATEGY
The challenge in identifying the effects of water polluting behavior on human health
is finding exogenous variation in water pollution that is also large enough to capture an
economically measurable effect. There are many plausible reasons why exposure to, and
consumption of, impure water may be endogenously determined. For instance, poorer
individuals who have a lower stock of health may be financially or behaviorally
constrained from consuming clean water. Instead of correlating local water pollution
with local health outcomes, we focus on the diarrheal incidence in a given village due to
individuals who are geographically separated but whose (unregulated or unenforced)
polluting behavior may affect downstream villages through river networks. Relying on
the identifying assumption that year-to-year changes in upstream polluting behavior are
exogenous to downstream diarrheal incidence, we estimate a linear probability model:





+γv + ηpt + εvpt
(3.2)
13. Three sets of verifications were conducted. First, the GIS open source algorithms were compared
against the ESRI algorithms. Second, the flow accumulations were consistent with the official Indonesian
River Network. Third, the construction of drainage basins was verified by ensuring the official rivers net-
work flowed properly through each basin ensuring that the constructed basins were logically sound.
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I(·) is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the village v in province p at time t had an
outbreak of diarrheal disease.14 Upstreamjvpt is the number of people upstream of
village v that are engaging in type j polluting behavior (i.e. trash, bathing) in province p
at time t. Similarly, Downstreamjvpt is the number of people downstream of village v that
are engaging in type j polluting behavior. γv denotes the village fixed-effects that control
for time-invariant heterogeneity across villages and ηpt are the province-year fixed
effects that control for provincial level shocks across all years. εvrt is the error term, with
standard errors clustered at the drainage basin to allow for arbitrary serial correlation
across villages along the same drainage basin over time.
While focusing on geographically-separated polluting behavior can avert some
endogeneity concerns, to the extent that individuals could geographically sort over time
with wealthier individuals ending up in villages with cleaner water, the coefficients on
upstream polluting, β1 j would remain biased. Since we use province-year fixed effects
and thereby control for all province-specific changes over time, we will focus on such
geographic sorting within a province over time. To overcome these concerns, we test the
validity of our identifying assumption with a battery of placebo tests. First, upstream
pollution could have an effect on downstream individuals’ polluting behavior, but
downstream polluting should not have a direct effect on upstream individuals’ health.
Second, we estimate the effect of polluting behavior on diseases that are not transmitted
through ingestion of contaminated water, such as measles, malaria, respiratory
infections, and dengue. If we are estimating a spurious geography-health correlation
instead of the causal effect of upstream bathing on downstream diarrheal incidence, then
we should also see association with these other diseases that are not waterborne. The
absence of such effects would support the identifying assumption. Third, we add a
range of time-varying control variables for changing demographic and poverty
characteristics. As detailed in Section 3.5, each of these tests supports our identifying
14. We validate the use of the binary outbreak variable as opposed to data on death rates in the appendix
(Table A.9).
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assumption and thereby increases our confidence that we are estimating the causal effect
of polluting behavior on diarrheal incidence.
Following equation (3.2), we also estimate avoidance behavior. In particular we test







+ γv + ηpt + εvpt
(3.3)
where H(·) is an indicator function equal to 1 if most people in that village drink water
from the river.
Three additional econometric issues bear noting. First, there could be potential
concerns over the choice of our estimator. We find that our estimates are robust to
different choices of estimator. In particular, we use the fixed effects logit estimator and
find that our results are qualitatively similar, as reported in appendix Table A.10.15 We
also find that a mere 0.3% of our observations (433 out of 108,991) had predicted values
outside the [0,1] range, suggesting that fit is not a concern with the use of a linear
probability model. Second, we cluster our standard errors at the drainage basin to allow
for errors to be correlated across villages along the same river segment and over time.
Given that the pollutants accumulate along a river segment, clustering at the drainage
basin allows for conservative inference on the effects of upstream polluting behavior.
Third, given different populations across villages, we show in appendix Table A.9 that
our results are robust to population-weighted generalized least squares (GLS)
estimation.
15. Note that the estimation of the logit model in the table presents the coefficient of the panel logit model,
and not the marginal effect.
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3.5 RESULTS
We investigate the health effects of two kinds of non-industrial riparian polluting
behavior - bathing and trash disposal. We simultaneously estimate the effects of these
different polluting behaviors using equation (3.2) and find strong evidence that
upstream bathing causes increased diarrheal incidence. Specifically, we find that a one
standard deviation increase in the number of people bathing upstream from a village
(182,940 individuals) increases the probability of diarrheal outbreak in that village by
4.59 percentage points (Table 4.14, column 2). Using the within sample average of
18.29% diarrheal incidence, this corresponds to a 25.10 % effect.16 The result is stable to
the choice of specification (Appendix Table A.10) and limited to villages where the
primary source of water is the river (Table 4.14, column 2-3). The magnitude of the effect
of upstream bathing on downstream diarrheal incidence is considerably larger when
limiting our sample to only those villages where the primary source of drinking water is
the river. Cumulatively yet conservatively, we estimate that upstream bathing can
explain 865 deaths, which is 7.5% of all diarrheal deaths in our sample, suggesting that
there is a large human cost to seemingly benign polluting behavior.
Notably, we find no evidence on the impact of upstream trash disposal on
downstream diarrheal incidence. It is important to note that these are equilibrium
effects, net of avoidance behavior specific to upstream polluting behavior. As a result,
the absence of effects on in-river trash-disposal could simply be evidence of strong
avoidance behavior. Later in this section we will separately estimate the avoidance
behavior in response to upstream polluting behavior.
The contrast between the effects of upstream bathing and upstream trash disposal is
of interest. Since the effects in Table 4.14 are net of avoidance behavior, these results
suggest that downstream populations exhibit avoidance behavior in response to trash
16. We report the results per 100,000 individuals, which corresponds to a 2.52 percentage point effect or
13.7% effect.
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and not to pollutants entering the river through bathing in it. While we cannot explicitly
or directly test the motivations behind this gap in avoidance behavior between the
different sources of pollution, we hypothesize two plausible explanations. First, trash
disposal in the river may pose a higher health risk than in-river bathing, and as such
individuals are more active in avoiding the risk arising from the former. Yet, given the
large health cost of upstream bathing, this seems less likely. Instead we favor the second
explanation, that trash disposal results in pollutants that are visible to the naked eye, in
contrast to impurities generated from bathing that are less or not visible to individuals.
This explanation is consistent with our results in Table 4.17 that individuals stop
drinking water from the river in response to upstream trash polluting but not in
response to upstream bathing.
Additionally, we test for non-linearities in Appendix Table A.11 and find no evidence
to support a non-linear relationship between exposure to upstream river bathing and
downstream diarrheal incidence.
3.5.1 Avoidance Behavior
In this subsection, we quantify the extent to which individuals engage in avoidance
behavior in response to upstream polluting behavior (Table 4.17). We find some
evidence of avoidance behavior in response to upstream in-river trash disposal, but no
evidence for avoidance behavior with respect to river bathing. Specifically, one standard
deviation (37,853 individuals) increase in upstream bathers reduces river water
consumption by 0.65 percentage points (p-value = 0.06), which corresponds to a 5%
effect.17 While we cannot provide specific behavioral or structural explanations for this
gap in avoidance behavior, combined with the evidence on the net effects from Table
4.14, we cautiously conclude that individuals exhibit greater avoidance behavior with
respect to visible pollutants such as trash than less visible pollutants arising from
17. In Table 4.17, we report that that a 100,000 individuals engaging in upstream trash disposal reduces
river water consumption by 1.71 percentage points, which corresponds to a 5% effect.
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bathing, making them potentially more lethal. This is consistent with a negligible net
effect of upstream trash disposal on downstream diarrheal incidence.
3.5.2 Topographic and Geographic Factors
Next we isolate effects based on different geographies to deduce whether (1) the
results are consistent with the topography of villages (flat versus hilly), which would
affect the rate of water flow, and (2) there are systematic differences in the effects of
upstream bathing across urban and rural villages in our sample. In Table 4.16 we
provide results breaking down the effect of upstream bathing by topography (columns
2-3) and by urbanization (columns 4-5). Consistent with our intuition, we find that the
bulk of the effect is concentrated in flat rather than hilly villages due to the propensity
for eutrophication in stagnant water (Jiménez 2006). By contrast, we find no evidence of
differential impacts in rural versus urban locations, suggesting that avoidance behavior
may not be region-specific.
3.5.3 Placebo Tests
In this section we provide the results from a battery of placebo and falsification tests
to demonstrate the strength of our identification strategy, and consequently the validity
of our identifying assumption. Table 4.15 shows that the effect we find is (1) specific to
diarrheal incidence and (2) specific to upstream polluting behavior. As shown in the
table, we find no evidence of an effect on diarrheal incidence in a given village in
response to downstream bathing. Not only is the effect of downstream bathing
statistically indistinguishable from zero, it is also an order of magnitude smaller than the
effect of upstream polluting. Therefore, concerns over drainage basin specific,
time-varying factors that are correlated with both polluting behavior and diarrheal
outcomes may be overstated.
Additionally, we follow Garg (2015) and provide placebo tests on other diseases
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(Table 4.15, columns 2-5). Spurious correlation between downstream health (driven by
demographic or political economy factors) and upstream polluting behavior should be
shared when predicting the impact of upstream pollutants on other disease outbreaks.
For instance, if individuals were geographically sorting over time in response to poor
health conditions (but not to upstream bathing), then we should also expect to see a
correlation with incidence of at least one of the other diseases. The absence of any
noticeable or meaningful effect on any of the other diseases adds support to the validity
of our identification strategy.
3.6 POLICY SIMULATIONS
The impact of upstream bathing on downstream health suggests that policy responses
to river pollution should be targeted with consideration to geography. Therefore, we
conduct a set of policy simulations by imposing increasingly stringent moratoriums on
river bathing (Table 4.18).18 Tailored policy options are particularly relevant in Indonesia
and other developing countries where limited resources for enforcement require
precision targeting of point-source pollution.
We show that the geography of targeting is essential to cost-effective policy. We
categorize all sample villages into deciles based on total downriver population. Villages
located near a river’s headwaters with a large downstream population are grouped into
the first decile while most downstream villages are grouped into the tenth decile (Table
4.18). Targeting upstream villages generates the largest benefit - targeting the most
upstream villages is an order of magnitude more effective than targeting downstream
18. Simulations are cumulative across all four sample years (2000, 2003, 2006 and 2008) and the exposure
variable (upstream bathing population) is updated by recalculating the sample mean with a moratorium
imposed on villages that fall under the targeting rule. Epidemics are predicted using the rate of 0.0252 per
100,000 upstream individuals and deaths are predicted using the sample average of 0.58 diarrhea-related
fatalities occurring within a village per diarrhea outbreak. Elasticity measures are calculated as the percent-
age change in diarrhea-related deaths divided by the percentage change in bathing individuals for each
policy increment. Note that the marginal elasticities are not forced to be decreasing as they are calculated
for incremental adjustments to the policy rather than as percentage changes from the no-regulation baseline
(which would be necessarily decreasing in magnitude).
68
villages. Specifically, avoiding a single diarrheal death requires preventing 971,000
individuals in the most downstream decile from bathing but only 82,000 individuals in
the most upstream decile. Our findings are therefore consistent with recent work on the
political economy of water pollution (Lipscomb and Mobarak 2016).
The baseline case, which most closely resembles the current state of affairs in
Indonesia, has no regulation on river bathing activity. Population deciles with the largest
downstream populations are then targeted incrementally until a complete moratorium
on river bathing is achieved. Column 2 in Table 4.18 shows the number of individuals
bathing in the river in each decile.19 In our two extreme cases, the absence of regulation
on river bathing allows the 865 deaths attributable to river bathing to persist while a
strict moratorium on river bathing prevents all of these deaths (Table 4.18, column 3).
However, avoided deaths on decile-level moratoriums is not a comparable measure
across the different deciles that have varying number of bathers. We generate two
measures that allow us to compare moratoriums on different deciles - average and
marginal number of individuals who must stop bathing to avoid a single instance of
diarrheal mortality (Table 4.18, columns 3 and 4 respectively). These cost calculations are
akin to average and marginal costs of the policies per unit of benefit (Figure 4.15).
Columns (3) and (4) show that a policymaker interested in reducing diarrheal deaths
would have to inconvenience (or compensate) the fewest number of individuals per
avoided death in the most upstream decile - 82,000 individuals who bathe in a river,
versus 971,000 individuals in the most downstream decile. Conversely, in columns 5 and
6 (Table 4.18), we develop an elasticity measure that shows reductions in mortality from
a 1% reduction in decile-specific river bathers (Figure 4.16). Reducing top-decile bathers
by 1% reduces marginal downstream diarrhea-related mortalities by 2.54% but reducing
the lowest-decile bathers by 1% reduces marginal mortalities by only 1.61%.
19. Deciles are constructed based on total population, not bathing-in-river populations.
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3.7 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we construct and employ a novel data set on Indonesia’s drainage
basins to provide the first causal evidence that household-level polluting behavior and
in particular upstream in-river bathing generates large downstream health externalities.
Our results have particular relevance for policymakers for several reasons. First, we
uncover a previously ignored source of household level pollution: in-river bathing. We
find that upstream river bathing can explain as many as 865 deaths over four years
representing 7.5% of all diarrheal deaths in our sample. This represents a large human
cost from a source of river pollution that the literature has almost entirely ignored.
Second, we find that targeting based on geographic location of the source of pollution
can result in substantial health savings. In particular, a 1% decrease in in-river bathers in
the most upstream decile reduces fatalities by 2.54%. By contrast, a 1% decrease in
in-river bathers in the most downstream decile reduces fatalities by only 1.62%. Third,
we find suggestive evidence that individuals exhibit avoidance behavior to visible but
not invisible pollutants. If salience drives a wedge between the marginal benefit and
marginal cost of avoidance behavior, investment in prevention of these “silent" killers
may yield considerable health savings. Instead of large scale government programs
aimed at river basin cleanup which may be financially infeasible, policymakers could
attempt to enact policies aimed at preventing polluting behavior. Future work could
explore the health impacts of avoidance behavior to previously understudied point and






Figure 4.1: WS Provider Type by Municipality
Notes: This map shows the breakdown of Brazilian municipalities by type of WS provider. Municipalities
for which there are no observations are shaded in white. Bold lines indicate the division Brazilian states.
The state of Mato Grosso (in central-west Brazil) eliminated its state WS company in 1998 and thus is not
included in the analysis. The Brasilia Federal District is also excluded from the analysis. Data on WS
company type is provided by the Ministry of Cities, and the administrative boundary map is provided by
IBGE.
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Figure 4.2: Total Investment
Notes: This graph shows the average total investment level in the municipality by each type of WS company
for a given year. The solid line represents the average yearly value of investment for all municipalities that
self-provide WS service. The dashed line represents the yearly average across all municipalities that have
WS services provided by state companies. The vertical dotted line depicts the year the Bill 5.296/2005 was
proposed
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Figure 4.3: Investment from Own Resources
Notes: This graph shows the average investment via own resources in the municipality by each type of
WS company for a given year. The solid line represents the average yearly value of investment for all
municipalities that self-provide WS service. The dashed line represents the yearly average across all mu-
nicipalities that have WS services provided by state companies. The vertical dotted line depicts the year the
Bill 5.296/2005 was proposed
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Figure 4.4: Investment from Onerous Resources
Notes: This graph shows the average investment via onerous resources in the municipality by each type
of WS company for a given year. The solid line represents the average yearly value of investment for
all municipalities that self-provide WS service. The dashed line represents the yearly average across all
municipalities that have WS services provided by state companies. The vertical dotted line depicts the year
the Bill 5.296/2005 was proposed
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Figure 4.5: Investment from Nononerous Resources
Notes: This graph shows the average investment via nononerous resources in the municipality by each
type of WS company for a given year. The solid line represents the average yearly value of investment
for all municipalities that self-provide WS service. The dashed line represents the yearly average across all
municipalities that have WS services provided by state companies. The vertical dotted line depicts the year
the Bill 5.296/2005 was proposed
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Figure 4.6: Investment in Water Network
Notes: This graph shows the average investment in the water network in the municipality by each type
of WS company for a given year. The solid line represents the average yearly value of investment for
all municipalities that self-provide WS service. The dashed line represents the yearly average across all
municipalities that have WS services provided by state companies. The vertical dotted line depicts the year
the Bill 5.296/2005 was proposed
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Figure 4.7: Investment in Sewer Network
Notes: This graph shows the average investment in the sewer network in the municipality by each type
of WS company for a given year. The solid line represents the average yearly value of investment for
all municipalities that self-provide WS service. The dashed line represents the yearly average across all
municipalities that have WS services provided by state companies. The vertical dotted line depicts the year
the Bill 5.296/2005 was proposed
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Figure 4.8: Other Network Investments
Notes: This graph shows the average investment in the general WS network in the municipality by each
type of WS company for a given year. The solid line represents the average yearly value of investment
for all municipalities that self-provide WS service. The dashed line represents the yearly average across all
municipalities that have WS services provided by state companies. The vertical dotted line depicts the year
the Bill 5.296/2005 was proposed
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Figure 4.9: Effects of Basic Sanitation Plan on Water Distribution Loss Index by Year
Notes: This figure plots the θk coefficients from the event-study equation: Indmt = α + ∑−2k=−6 θkPlanmtk +
∑6k=0 θkPlanmtk + γ
′Xmt + λm + µt + εmt, where Planmtk is an indicator for the k year from the enactment of
the basic sanitation plan in municipality m in year t. The omitted category is the year before implementa-
tion, k = −1. The dependent variable in the event-study regression is the log value of the loss index. The
95% confidence intervals are depicted by the dashed lines. The year of plan implementation is shown by
the solid vertical line at t = 0.
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Figure 4.10: Effects of Basic Sanitation Plan on Gross Linear Loss Index by Year
Notes: This figure plots the θk coefficients from the event-study equation: Indmt = α + ∑−2k=−6 θkPlanmtk +
∑6k=0 θkPlanmtk + γ
′Xmt + λm + µt + εmt, where Planmtk is an indicator for the k year from the enactment of
the basic sanitation plan in municipality m in year t. The omitted category is the year before implementa-
tion, k = −1. The dependent variable in the event-study regression is the log value of the loss index. The
95% confidence intervals are depicted by the dashed lines. The year of plan implementation is shown by
the solid vertical line at t = 0.
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Figure 4.11: Effects of Basic Sanitation Plan on Water Connection Loss Index by Year
Notes: This figure plots the θk coefficients from the event-study equation: Indmt = α + ∑−2k=−6 θkPlanmtk +
∑6k=0 θkPlanmtk + γ
′Xmt + λm + µt + εmt, where Planmtk is an indicator for the k year from the enactment of
the basic sanitation plan in municipality m in year t. The omitted category is the year before implementa-
tion, k = −1. The dependent variable in the event-study regression is the log value of the loss index. The
95% confidence intervals are depicted by the dashed lines. The year of plan implementation is shown by
the solid vertical line at t = 0.
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Figure 4.12: Effects of Basic Sanitation Plan on Billing Loss Index by Year
Notes: This figure plots the θk coefficients from the event-study equation: Indmt = α + ∑−2k=−6 θkPlanmtk +
∑6k=0 θkPlanmtk + γ
′Xmt + λm + µt + εmt, where Planmtk is an indicator for the k year from the enactment of
the basic sanitation plan in municipality m in year t. The omitted category is the year before implementa-
tion, k = −1. The dependent variable in the event-study regression is the log value of the loss index. The
95% confidence intervals are depicted by the dashed lines. The year of plan implementation is shown by
the solid vertical line at t = 0.
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Figure 4.13: Percentage of Villages Declaring a Diarrheal Outbreak in a Year
Figure 4.14: Construction of River Network Data. (Left) Low and High Order Rivers (Right) Im-
proved Assignment
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Figure 4.15: Marginal and Average Cost by Geographic Deciles
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Figure 4.16: Percentage Reduction in Mortality Per 1% Decrease in Bathers by Targeting Rule
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4.2 TABLES















Self-run company, Post-reform 2,970** 1,775*** 1,973** 10.60 818.0* 1,683** 467.6***
(1,225) (459.8) (823.8) (164.7) (439.8) (852.0) (140.5)
Observations 16,152 16,152 16,152 16,152 16,152 16,152 16,152
R-squared 0.737 0.609 0.439 0.462 0.612 0.652 0.519
Muni FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 4.1: WS Investment
Notes: Investment levels are measured in ,000s Reals. Control variables include data on population and
municipal finances (gdp, gva, taxes). Panel is balanced for the period 2001-2012. Robust standard errors
clustered at the municipality level are shown in parentheses.
*** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level; ** at the 5% level; and * at the 10% level.
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Self-run company in 4,573** 2,397*** 2,770** 236.1 1,241* 2,786* 510.3**
Metro area, Post-reform (2,236) (877.2) (1,386) (261.6) (730.5) (1,626) (226.1)
Self-run company not in 1,653 1,264*** 1,319 -174.5 471.0 778.0 432.6**
Metro area, Post-reform (1,142) (413.6) (960.5) (146.9) (418.0) (752.8) (173.8)
Observations 16,152 16,152 16,152 16,152 16,152 16,152 16,152
R-squared 0.737 0.610 0.440 0.462 0.612 0.652 0.519
Muni FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 4.2: WS Investment by Metropolitan Area
Notes: Investment levels are measured in ,000s Reals. Control variables include data on population and
municipal finances (gdp, gva, taxes). Panel is balanced for the period 2001-2012. Robust standard errors
clustered at the municipality level are shown in parentheses.
*** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level; ** at the 5% level; and * at the 10% level.
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Self-run company with 7,800** 3,085*** 5,331** 194.0 2,366** 4,837** 670.0**
High share of State GDP, Post-reform (3,184) (1,148) (2,276) (320.0) (996.0) (2,349) (295.0)
Self-run company with 478.8 1,099*** 241.4 -83.98 19.93 57.45 363.3**
Low share of State GDP, Post-reform (612.1) (342.1) (244.4) (147.1) (305.5) (293.3) (145.8)
Observations 16,152 16,152 16,152 16,152 16,152 16,152 16,152
R-squared 0.737 0.611 0.445 0.462 0.613 0.653 0.519
Muni FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 4.3: WS Investment by Share of State GDP
Notes: Investment levels are measured in ,000s Reals. Control variables include data on population and
municipal finances (gdp, gva, taxes)s. Panel is balanced for the period 2001-2012. Robust standard errors
clustered at the municipality level are shown in parentheses.
*** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level; ** at the 5% level; and * at the 10% level.
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Self-run company with 3,271** 1,899*** 2,218** -86.85 682.7* 2,065* 480.1***
Different Party, Post-reform (1,506) (586.3) (1,044) (170.1) (397.2) (1,126) (177.5)
Self-run company with 2,137 1,432** 1,295 280.1 1,192 627.5 433.1**
Same Party, Post-reform (1,760) (595.9) (1,104) (298.3) (1,088) (672.6) (190.1)
Observations 16,152 16,152 16,152 16,152 16,152 16,152 16,152
R-squared 0.737 0.610 0.440 0.462 0.612 0.652 0.519
Muni FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 4.4: WS Investment by 2004 Municipal Election Result
Notes: Investment levels are measured in ,000s Reals. Control variables include data on population and
municipal finances (gdp, gva, taxes). Panel is balanced for the period 2001-2012. Robust standard errors
clustered at the municipality level are shown in parentheses.
*** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level; ** at the 5% level; and * at the 10% level.
90
10km Buffer Zone















Self-run company, Post-reform 2,795* 1,755*** 1,859** -720.1 432.8 2,052** 491.0***
(1,436) (480.8) (883.0) (522.2) (768.7) (896.2) (142.6)
Observations 4,412 4,412 4,412 4,412 4,412 4,412 4,412
R-squared 0.465 0.602 0.353 0.389 0.386 0.373 0.344
25km Buffer Zone















Self-run company, Post-reform 2,772** 1,661*** 1,575* -512.1 534.6 1,773** 461.4***
(1,377) (479.6) (920.4) (372.4) (622.8) (898.8) (148.8)
Observations 5,756 5,756 5,756 5,756 5,756 5,756 5,756
R-squared 0.545 0.646 0.442 0.393 0.413 0.463 0.438
50km Buffer Zone















Self-run company, Post-reform 3,011** 1,726*** 1,735** -346.1 790.2 1,689* 484.0***
(1,279) (467.9) (878.9) (291.0) (501.8) (882.1) (145.8)
Observations 7,735 7,735 7,735 7,735 7,735 7,735 7,735
R-squared 0.571 0.643 0.439 0.463 0.413 0.529 0.431
100km Buffer Zone















Self-run company, Post-reform 2,476* 1,734*** 1,935** -105.5 581.1 1,439* 456.1***
(1,287) (463.4) (834.2) (198.5) (505.9) (866.7) (142.6)
Observations 11,987 11,987 11,987 11,987 11,987 11,987 11,987
R-squared 0.736 0.617 0.435 0.459 0.611 0.653 0.520
Table 4.5: WS Investment with Buffer Zones
Notes: Panels A, B, C, and D include as the control group those municipalities with state-run WS service
which are within 10km, 25km, 50km, and 100km of a self-run municipality’s boundary, respectively.
Investment levels are measured in ,000s Reals. Control variables include data on population and municipal
finances (gdp, gva, taxes). Panel is balanced for the period 2001-2012. Robust standard errors clustered at
the municipality level are shown in parentheses.
*** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level; ** at the 5% level; and * at the 10% level.
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Self-run company, Post-reform 2,955*** 1,799*** 1,996*** 8.706 784.3** 1,707*** 474.6***
(584.0) (146.6) (233.4) (203.3) (357.9) (323.6) (67.89)
Observations 16,152 16,152 16,152 16,152 16,152 16,152 16,152
Adj. R-squared 0.690 0.450 0.268 0.310 0.532 0.599 0.446
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 4.6: WS Investment (Spatial Error Model)
Notes: Investment levels are measured in ,000s Reals. Control variables include data on population and
municipal finances (gdp, gva, taxes). Panel is balanced for the period 2001-2012. SEM standard errors are
shown in parentheses.













Self-run company, 2,854** 2,243** 2,770*** 3,114** 34.30***
2 years post-reform (1,176) (1,092) (910.1) (1,477) (10.50)
Observations 15,169 15,256 15,262 15,283 15,192
R-squared 0.986 0.987 0.990 0.989 0.316
Muni FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes












Self-run company, 4,191*** 3,748*** 5,206*** 4,552*** 60.08***
2 years post-reform (1,132) (1,064) (1,527) (1,413) (19.90)
Observations 15,169 15,256 15,262 15,283 15,192
R-squared 0.986 0.987 0.990 0.989 0.316
Muni FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 4.7: WS System Access
This table reports the results of six OLS regressions. Length of water network is measured in km. Control
variables include data on population and municipal finances (gdp, gva, taxes). Panel is balanced for the
period 2001-2012. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level are shown in parentheses.
*** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level; ** at the 5% level; and * at the 10% level.
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Mean SD Min Max
Loss Indexes
Water Distribution Loss 28.62 14.06 0 100.00
Gross Linear Loss 14.85 46.62 0 3382.47
Water Connection Loss 202.99 177.25 0 3345.65
Water Billing Loss 21.33 18.39 0 100.00
System Access
Volume of Water per Household 17.90 7.74 0 138.80
% of Urban Population with WS Access 96.07 9.93 0 100.00
Water Network Length per Connection 18.43 14.97 0 565.30
Actively Households per Connection 1.10 0.16 1 3.87








Total Population 0.0422 -0.187** -0.347 0.272 0.325
(0.0937) (0.0863) (0.231) (0.256) (0.240)
Urban Population 0.0164 0.0382 0.0885 -0.164 -0.0464
(0.0408) (0.0369) (0.0662) (0.100) (0.133)
GDP -0.0135 0.0136 -0.112 0.105 0.0780
(0.0457) (0.0253) (0.130) (0.131) (0.110)
Taxes 0.0583 0.0445 0.0377 -0.0247 0.0827
(0.0472) (0.0371) (0.0310) (0.0184) (0.0730)
GVA (agriculture) -0.00532 -0.0134 0.0674 -0.0361 -0.00690
(0.0206) (0.0179) (0.0562) (0.0669) (0.0305)
GVA (industry) 0.00367 -0.00327 0.0228 -0.0209 -0.00784
(0.0104) (0.00989) (0.0269) (0.0265) (0.0284)
GVA (services) -0.0728 -0.0604 -0.0566 -0.000829 -0.170
(0.0496) (0.0504) (0.0532) (0.0484) (0.104)
GVA (admin) 0.0727 0.111 0.234 -0.0449 0.00719
(0.0516) (0.0871) (0.155) (0.130) (0.111)
Observations 6,553 1,275 1,164 1,525 2,589
R-squared 0.991 0.996 0.993 0.944 0.987
Table 4.9: Time-varying Municipal Characteristics and Implementation Year
Notes: The columns display the estimation result of regressing the time varying characteristics on the in-
dicator for whether a municipality m has a basic sanitation plan in force during year t. The estimating
equation also includes time, municipality, and party-of-the-mayor fixed effects. Robust standard errors
clustered at the municipality level are shown in parentheses.
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Full Flat Hilly Urban Rural
Diarrhea 0.183 0.158 0.188 0.158 0.185
(0.387) (0.365) (0.391) (0.365) (0.389)
Respiratory Infections 0.111 0.0978 0.118 0.101 0.112
(0.315) (0.297) (0.323) (0.301) (0.316)
Measles 0.0807 0.0748 0.0866 0.0682 0.0820
(0.272) (0.263) (0.281) (0.252) (0.274)
Malaria 0.207 0.165 0.231 0.127 0.216
(0.405) (0.371) (0.421) (0.333) (0.411)
Dengue 0.0613 0.0698 0.0420 0.213 0.0454
(0.240) (0.255) (0.201) (0.409) (0.208)
Observations 108,994 54,122 23,127 10,298 98,696
Table 4.12: Probability of Village-Level Disease Outbreaks
Mean(sd)
Do most individuals bathe in the river? 0.791
(0.407)
Do most individuals drink from the river? 0.343
(0.475)
Do most individuals dispose trash in the river? 0.0915
(0.288)
Observations 108,994
Table 4.13: Dumping Variables Summary Statistics
Notes: The mean incidence of the different diseases are statistically indistinguishable from each other using
the Tukey’s test as well as the less conservative Fisher’s LSD.
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Was there an outbreak of diarrhea? Full Sample Full Sample Drink from Not Drink
River from River
Upstream Bathing 0.0225** 0.0252** 0.0564*** -0.000656
(100,000 individuals) (0.0105) (0.0107) (0.0181) (0.0132)
Upstream Trash -0.00504 -0.00182 -0.0174 -0.00412
(100,000 individuals) (0.0111) (0.0120) (0.0165) (0.0133)
Observations 108,991 106,797 36,819 69,978
R-squared 0.012 0.013 0.023 0.012
Village FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls No Yes Yes Yes
Table 4.14: Impact of Upstream Bathing on Downstream Diarrheal Incidence
Notes: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. All specifications include village and province-year
fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the river basin levels. All specifications include additional
controls for total village population, total upstream population and total downstream population. Columns
(2) - (4) include additional controls: dominant source of income in village, geography of village, quality of
governance (education of village head), access to medical facilities in the village and political status of the
village.
*** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level; ** at the 5% level; and * at the 10% level.
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Was there an outbreak of Diarrhea Respiratory Measles Malaria Dengue
Upstream Bathing (100,000 HH) 0.0225** 0.00548 0.000182 0.0105 -0.00711
(100,000 individuals) (0.0105) (0.00772) (0.00846) (0.0116) (0.00737)
Downstream Bathing (100,000 HH) 0.00315 0.000529 0.00322 0.00639*** -0.000797
(100,000 individuals) (0.00250) (0.00215) (0.00229) (0.00243) (0.00264)
Observations 108,991 108,991 108,991 108,991 108,991
R-squared 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.015 0.026
Table 4.15: Placebo Tests
Notes: All specifications include village and province-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the
river basin levels. The specifications include additional controls for total village population, total upstream
population and total downstream population. The sample is limited to villages that self-report proximity
to a river.
*** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level; ** at the 5% level; and * at the 10% level.
Was there an outbreak of diarrhea? Full Sample Flat Hilly Urban Rural
Upstream Bathing 0.0225** 0.0249* -0.0589 0.0193 0.0211*
(100,000 individuals) (0.0105) (0.0142) (0.0529) (0.0212) (0.0117)
Downstream Bathing 0.00315 0.00280 -0.00000 0.00256 0.00579
(100,000 individuals) (0.00250) (0.00295) (0.00923) (0.00426) (0.00360)
Observations 108,991 54,122 23,124 10,298 98,693
R-squared 0.012 0.012 0.030 0.047 0.013
Table 4.16: Results Disaggregated By Geography
Notes: All specifications include village and province-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the
river basin levels. The specifications include additional controls for total village population, total upstream
population and total downstream population. The sample is limited to villages that self-report proximity
to a river.
*** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level; ** at the 5% level; and * at the 10% level.
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Did Villages Drink from River? Full Urban Rural
Upstream Bathing 0.00798 -0.00123 0.0123
(100,000 individuals) (0.0111) (0.0181) (0.0127)
Upstream Trash -0.0146* -0.0114 -0.0161*
(100,000 individuals) (0.00780) (0.0114) (0.00936)
Observations 108,991 10,298 98,693
R-squared 0.016 0.043 0.019
Table 4.17: Avoidance Behavior
Notes: All specifications include village and province-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the
river basin levels. The specifications include additional controls for total village population, total upstream
population and total downstream population. The sample is limited to villages that self-report proximity
to a river.
*** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level; ** at the 5% level; and * at the 10% level.
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No regulation of river bathing 0 0 - - - -
Top decile only 2.4 29 82 82 2.54 2.54
Deciles (1-2) 5.5 63 88 93 2.36 2.28
Deciles (1-3) 11.5 124 93 98 2.23 2.21
Deciles (1-4) 21.8 227 96 100 2.15 2.27
Deciles (1-5) 37.8 358 106 122 1.96 2.03
Deciles (1-6) 55.8 495 113 132 1.84 2.13
Deciles (1-7) 77.6 623 125 170 1.66 1.97
Deciles (1-8) 103.7 734 141 235 1.47 1.80
Deciles (1-9) 133.6 817 164 363 1.26 1.61
Complete Moratorium on river bathing 179.5 864 208 971 1.00 1.00
Table 4.18: Policy Simulations
Notes: Simulations include 108,990 village-year observations (2000, 2003, 2006 and 2008). Each 100,000 up-
stream bathing individuals increase epidemic rates by 0.0251 while each epidemic yields 0.58 deaths, which
is the sample average for all on-river villages across all years (excluding Java). The targeting rule deciles
are based on total downstream population. For example, the top decile includes only those top 10% of
villages with the largest downstream populations. Column one shows that increasingly stringent moratori-
ums on river bathing increase the number of bathing individuals affected, which corresponds directly with
a reduction in predicted mortality displayed in column 2. Columns 3 and 4 capture the number of bathers
that must be removed to prevent a death where column 3 is the average effect across all deciles under the
moratorium and column 4 is the marginal effect of the most downstream moratorium decile. Columns 5
and 6 present estimates of the elasticity of placing a moratorium on river bathing. Column 5 captures the
change in mortality per 1% decrease in bathers, averaged over the deciles under the moratorium. Column
6 presents the effect of the change in mortality per 1% decrease in bathers for the marginal decile placed
under moratorium. Here, elasticities are generally decreasing resembling the impact of targeting the most
upstream and detrimental individuals. However, because the policy rule is based on cumulative down-
stream population along the river, not the downstream bathing population, it is possible for the marginal
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Table A.1: Municipality Characteristics and Sample Entry
Notes: This table presents the results of regressing the first year that municipality m is observed in the
sample on various municipality characteristics. All characteristics are the values in the year 2001, and the
population and finance variables are taken in logs.
*** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level; ** at the 5% level; and * at the 10% level.
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Self-run company, Post-reform 2,970** 1,775*** 1,973** 10.60 818.0* 1,683** 467.6***
(1,225) (459.8) (823.8) (164.7) (439.8) (852.0) (140.5)
Observations 16,152 16,152 16,152 16,152 16,152 16,152 16,152
R-squared 0.737 0.609 0.439 0.462 0.612 0.652 0.519
Muni FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls No No No No No No No
Table A.2: WS Investment - No Controls
This table reports the results of eight OLS regressions. Each column corresponds to a different dependent
variable relating to type of WS investment in a given municipality. Robust standard errors clustered at the
municipality level are shown in parentheses.
*** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level; ** at the 5% level; and * at the 10% level.















Self-run company, Post-reform 1,426** 984.9*** 918.8** 32.70 391.7* 795.2* 255.5***
(626.3) (249.7) (393.3) (116.8) (234.6) (425.9) (69.44)
Observations 43,290 43,290 43,290 43,290 43,290 43,290 43,290
R-squared 0.733 0.595 0.435 0.445 0.611 0.644 0.520
Muni FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table A.3: WS Investment - Unbalanced Panel
Investment levels are measured in ,000s Reals. Control variables include data on population and municipal
finances (gdp, gva, taxes). Panel is unbalanced and includes all municipalities that enter the dataset in
any year between 2001 and 2012. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level are shown in
parentheses.
*** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level; ** at the 5% level; and * at the 10% level.
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Self-run company, Post-reform 1,838 1,688*** 2,083** 94.66 363.6 1,014 396.4***
(1,485) (450.1) (848.2) (149.8) (647.9) (923.3) (130.2)
Observations 16,152 16,152 16,152 16,152 16,152 16,152 16,152
R-squared 0.741 0.614 0.444 0.472 0.618 0.655 0.522
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table A.4: WS Investment - State Specific Time Trend
Investment levels are measured in ,000s Reals. Control variables include data on population and municipal
finances (gdp, gva, taxes). Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level are shown in paren-
theses.
*** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level; ** at the 5% level; and * at the 10% level.















Self-run company, Post-Legislation 3,029** 1,891*** 2,100** 8.187 777.0 1,797* 491.0***
(1,426) (496.2) (932.1) (209.1) (557.3) (1,052) (164.3)
Observations 16,152 16,152 16,152 16,152 16,152 16,152 16,152
R-squared 0.737 0.610 0.440 0.462 0.612 0.652 0.519
Muni FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table A.5: WS Investment - Legislation Passage Date
Investment levels are measured in ,000s Reals. Control variables include data on population and municipal
finances (gdp, gva, taxes). Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level are shown in paren-
theses.










4-6 Years after Plan is Enacted -0.0448 -0.0706 -0.0545 -0.0352
in Municipality in Year of Observation (0.0662) (0.0666) (0.0945) (0.107)
1-3 Years after Plan is Enacted -0.0103 -0.00908 -0.0169 0.0431
in Municipality in Year of Observation (0.0348) (0.0372) (0.0507) (0.0548)
Initial Year that Plan is Enacted -0.0232 -0.0347 -0.0393 0.0156
in Municipality in Year of Observation (0.0277) (0.0284) (0.0407) (0.0366)
Observations 6,479 6,471 6,477 6,482
R-squared 0.807 0.895 0.814 0.865
Muni FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Muni Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table A.6: WS Loss Indexes with Municipality Specific Time Trend
Notes: Each column shows the estimation results of a separate regression. The vector of time-varying
municipality characteristics includes information on population, mayor’s political party, size, metro area
status, type of WS company (i.e. state-run or municipality-run), municipal gdp, taxes, and gross value
added for the four main sectors of the economy: agriculture, industry, services, and administration. Each
regression includes a municipality specific time trend. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality
level are shown in parentheses.










4-6 Years after Plan is Enacted -0.151*** -0.0765 -0.195*** -0.325***
in Municipality in Year of Observation (0.0507) (0.0489) (0.0718) (0.0892)
1-3 Years after Plan is Enacted 0.00139 0.0243 -0.00120 -0.0232
in Municipality in Year of Observation (0.0300) (0.0287) (0.0431) (0.0499)
Initial Year that Plan is Enacted 0.00634 0.0118 0.00468 0.0285
in Municipality in Year of Observation (0.0245) (0.0236) (0.0358) (0.0353)
Observations 6,452 6,444 6,450 6,455
R-squared 0.672 0.809 0.674 0.775
Muni FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table A.7: 3 Month Delay in Effective Plan Enactment
Notes: Each column shows the estimation results of a separate regression. The vector of time-varying
municipality characteristics includes information on population, mayor’s political party, size, metro area
status, type of WS company (i.e. state-run or municipality-run), municipal gdp, taxes, and gross value
added for the four main sectors of the economy: agriculture, industry, services, and administration. Robust
standard errors clustered at the municipality level are shown in parentheses.










4-6 Years after Plan is Enacted -0.184*** -0.134** -0.255*** -0.239**
in Municipality in Year of Observation (0.0628) (0.0668) (0.0880) (0.112)
1-3 Years after Plan is Enacted -0.0302 -0.0261 -0.0518 0.0331
in Municipality in Year of Observation (0.0369) (0.0404) (0.0522) (0.0665)
Initial Year that Plan is Enacted -0.0175 -0.0368 -0.0401 0.0543
in Municipality in Year of Observation (0.0296) (0.0303) (0.0433) (0.0446)
Observations 4,236 4,234 4,236 4,243
R-squared 0.696 0.811 0.704 0.762
Muni FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table A.8: Municipalities With at Least 2 Post-Plan Observations
Notes: Each column shows the estimation results of a separate regression. The vector of time-varying
municipality characteristics includes information on population, mayor’s political party, size, metro area
status, type of WS company (i.e. state-run or municipality-run), municipal gdp, taxes, and gross value
added for the four main sectors of the economy: agriculture, industry, services, and administration. Robust
standard errors clustered at the municipality level are shown in parentheses.
*** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level; ** at the 5% level; and * at the 10% level.
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Log Mean Death Log Death
Rate per Epidemic Rate
Upstream Bathing (100,000 HH) 0.682*** 0.672***
(0.215) (0.207)




Number of Villages 15,252 15,252
Table A.9: Validation of Outbreak Variable with Data on Deaths
Notes: All specifications include village and province-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at
the river basin levels. The sample is limited to villages that self-report proximity to a river. Column (1) is
defined as the log of the average number of diarrheal deaths divided by the average population interacted
with the indicator variable denoting an outbreak in a village in a given year. Column (2) is the log of
the death rate. Both regressions are weighted by population to account for differential populations across
village and compute the average effect per person rather than per village.
*** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level; ** at the 5% level; and * at the 10% level.
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LPM Logit
Upstream Bathing (100,000 individuals) 0.0225** 0.176**
(0.0105) (0.0713)




Table A.10: Robustness to Choice of Estimator
Notes: All specifications include village and province-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at
the river basin levels. Both specifications include additional controls for total village population, total up-
stream population and total downstream population. Column (1) presents estimation using an OLS linear
probability model, with approximately 0.3% of predicted values lying outside the [0,1] range. Column (2)
presents the results of the fixed effects logit model. R-squared presented in the table is the psuedo-R2 calcu-
lated by the logit estimation. The number of observations using the FE Logit model is smaller than Column
(1) due to all-positive or all-negative outcomes for village across all 4 years of the panel being dropped. The
fixed effect logit model does not allow for the computation of the marginal effect at the mean value for the
variables of interest - for a more detailed discussion, see Kitazawa (2012).
*** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level; ** at the 5% level; and * at the 10% level.
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Linear Quadratic Logarithmic
Upstream Bathing (100,000 individuals) 0.0225** 0.0176
(0.0105) (0.0150)




Observations 108,991 108,991 108,991
R-squared 0.012 0.012 0.013
Village FE Yes Yes Yes
Province-Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Controls No No No
Table A.11: Testing for Non-Linearities
Notes: All specifications include village and province-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the
river basin levels. All specifications include additional controls for total village population, total upstream
population and total downstream population. The sample is limited to villages that self-report proximity
to a river. The mean number of upstream bathing households is 54,840.
*** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level; ** at the 5% level; and * at the 10% level.
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